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I. Introduction: Analyzing the EEOC at 35 In Search of New
Enforcement Paradigms
The enforcement of federal employment discrimination laws
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),'
although generally accepted as adding some overall value,2 has
1. The EEOC enforces the following federal laws: Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-17 (2001); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2001);
Equal Pay Act ("EPA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-262 (2001); and Titles I and IV of the
Americans With Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12212 (2001).
Generally, these laws prohibit employment discrimination based on race, color,
sex, religion, national origin, age, or disability. Furthermore, the statutes protect
against retaliation for opposing job discrimination or for filing a charge or
participating in proceedings under these laws. The EEOC has published a wealth
of information about its past and present on its Internet site. See EEOC 35th
Anniversary, at http://www.eeoc. gov/35th (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
2. The EEOC publishes information in its annual report describing the total
amount of money collected for victims of discrimination. The fiscal year 2000
report states that the EEOC collected $293.2 million in 2000 for victims, including
what the EEOC refers to as a record-breaking $245.7 million in pre-litigation
enforcement. See EEOC Accomplishments Report for Fiscal Year 2000, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/accomplishments-00.html. (last modified Jan. 18, 2001). The
amount of money collected in 2000 is still much less than fiscal year 1999, where
the EEOC collected $307.3 million. See Nancy Montwieler, Commission's Case
Inventory Keeps Dropping, But Monetary Benefits Were Lower Last Year, 6 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-1 (Jan. 9, 2001). However, some commentators have provided
persuasive data that laws passed by Congress prohibiting workplace discrimination
have improved the economic conditions for African-Americans as a whole or at
least created many more African-Americans who have reached middle class status.
See Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII's Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories,
and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 472-74 (1995); see also Major Impact of Title
VII is Cited as Seminar Marks 30-Year Anniversary, 122 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
D-24 (June 28, 1994) (discussing findings of a study conducted by Rutgers Law
Professor Alfred Blumrosen finding that Title VII has been "profoundly
successful" in opening jobs to minorities that historically had been closed to them).
Most information about the impact of Title VII does not separate the role of the
EEOC in that impact. See Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining
the Agency's Role in Employment Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 49 &
n.181 (1996). Nevertheless, by using its enforcement authority, the EEOC is able
to bring to bear resources to challenge class-based or systemic type discrimination.
For instance, in 2000 the EEOC received dozens of complaints about threats to
African-Americans and other members of minority groups involving the display of
"nooses" in the workplace. See Sana Siwolop, Nooses, Symbols of Race Hatred, at
Center of Workplace Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2000, at Al. Specifically, the
EEOC has brought racial harassment lawsuits against twenty companies where
nooses were allegedly involved. These suits stemmed from various EEOC
regional offices all over the country, including offices in Charlotte, Chicago,
Detroit, Miami, and San Francisco. Id. Because the EEOC only files a "few
hundred lawsuits a year," id., the fact that it has filed twenty noose-related lawsuits
is significant. Id. This use of the EEOC's power to file suits also suggests that in
egregious circumstances implicating systemic or national concerns, the EEOC's
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never met the intended goal of becoming a key mechanism in
eradicating discrimination in the workplace.3 A key reason for the
EEOC's enforcement failures traces back to the discriminatory
beliefs4 that clouded the initial passage of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,' the statute that created the EEOC. The
spineless compromises and last-minute deals, perpetuated by the
enforcement mechanisms have a place in our society and can be helpful in tackling
or eradicating discrimination in the workplace.
3. There are those, such as Professors Derrick Bell and Richard Delgado,
who believe discrimination is so firmly rooted in our society that it can never be
completely eradicated. See DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE
WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 97-100 (1992) (discussing Professor Bell's
belief that racism in our society is too intrinsic and deep-seated for the courts or
laws to eradicate it); Derrick A. Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363 (1992)
(suggesting that civil rights leaders should abandon efforts to use the law and the
legal system to remedy the effects of discrimination in our society and come to the
"racial realism," or acknowledgment, that discrimination has survived and will
continue to survive and cause frustration within the legal system); see also Derrick
Bell, Racism is Here to Stay: Now What?, 35 How. L.J. 79, 84 (1991); Richard
Delgado, Zero-Based Racial Politics and an Infinity-Based Response: Will Endless
Talking Cure America's Racial Ills?, 80 GEO. L.J. 1879, 1881-82 (1992); Richard
Delgado, On Taking Back Our Civil Rights Promises: When Equality Doesn't
Compute, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 579, 584 (1989); Turner, supra note 2, at 375-77
(discussing the themes of permanent racism and the various commentators,
including Professors Derrick Bell and Richard Delgado, who have consistently
made that claim). Professor Ronald Turner has even reached the conclusion that
"Title VII cannot reach or bring about the avowed and ever more distant statutory
goal of ending the exclusion of African-Americans and other protected groups
from the changing economic mainstream." Id. at 479-80. In contrast, Professor
Cynthia Estlund has argued that labor and employment discrimination laws have
successfully helped and can continue to help integrate the workplace, which has
now become an important arena for racial discourse. See generally Cynthia L.
Estlund, The Workplace in a Racially Diverse Society: Preliminary Thoughts on the
Role of Labor and Employment Law, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 49 (1998).
4. See Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and
1972: A Critical Analysis of the Legislative History and Administration of the Law,
2 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1977) (reviewing a lengthy document titled "The
Minority Report," presented by a group of conservative congressmen expressing
their opposition to the legislation during the debate over Title VII, expressing their
beliefs that banning employment discrimination was a "radical" change, arguing to
maintain the status quo, proclaiming "racial superiority by innuendo" and inciting
fear of change which led conservative members of Congress to introduce an "array
of amendments to modify or remove various portions of the bill under debate");
see also Pre 1965: Events Leading to the Creation of the EEOC, at
www.eeoc.gov/35th/pre1965 (last visited Nov. 10, 2001) (recognizing that the "most
serious compromise" in getting Title VII passed was the compromise that
"resulted in a bill that eliminated any real enforcement authority for EEOC").
Thus, the compromise leading to Title VII resulted from deals with Republicans
and southern Democrats, who were vehemently opposed to passing civil rights
legislation that would prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of race.
See infra Part II.B.
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-17 (2001).
2001] PROPOSING A NEW PARADIGM FOR EEOC ENFORCEMENT 309
longstanding divisions in the United States over slavery and race,
may have ended a record-long congressional debate and led to
passage of Title VII. However, those compromises also hampered
any significant impact by the EEOC as an enforcement agency
when it was given no power to enforce the law from the very
beginning.6
From its inception, the EEOC recognized that its power to
enforce its own investigative findings was virtually nonexistent.
Since then, Congress and the EEOC leadership have attempted
piecemeal efforts to reverse the initial failures and finally provide
the EEOC with strong enforcement powers, but those actions have
only led to a patchwork of hit-and-miss enforcement initiatives.7
For example, Congress first responded to its initial failure to
provide enforcement power to the EEOC by amending Title VII in
1972. Those amendments established that the EEOC had power to
enforce its findings by filing a private court action on its own behalf.
However, by starting the EEOC as a charge-handling agency,
rather than an enforcement agency, the EEOC has been forced to
6. After nearly twenty years of wrangling over several different bills to
address employment discrimination, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
See MICHAEL 1. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT 61 (1966). The debates surrounding the bill that became the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 were the longest debates in the history of Congress, due to a
Republican filibuster. Id. at 62 (noting that the filibuster "has been calculated at
534 hours, one minute, and thirty-seven seconds"); see Hill, supra note 4, at 2, 7
(noting that after being "[a]mended 105 times," after being considered and
debated by the "House Judiciary Committee twenty-two days, by the Rules
Committee seven days, by the House six days, and by the Senate eighty-three
days," and with an "extended debate in the Senate [that] lasted 534 hours, one
minute and thirty-seven seconds," "testimony from 101 witnesses, a record
comprising 2,649 pages, and innumerable compromises worked out in House and
Senate committees, the Civil Rights Act was adopted on July 2, 1964" with the
"most bitterly contested section of the Act [being] Title VII, covering
employment"). See generally CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE
LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACr
(1985) (describing background details of the debate leading to passage of Title
VII).
7. An independent group recently conducted an examination of the EEOC's
mediation program. The report of that independent group provides an excellent
review of the EEOC's charge processing cycles over the last twenty years, starting
in May 1977 with the reign of Chairwoman Eleanor Holmes Norton and ending in
2000 under the leadership of Chairwoman Ida Castro. The report also indicates
that virtually every enforcement initiative has been hindered by a lack of funds,
increasing responsibilities and overriding criticism that the charge processing
backlog has become unmanageable. See E. Patrick McDermott et al., An
Evaluation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Mediation
Program, at http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/report/ (Sept. 20, 2000) (click on link to
Part IV.C).
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focus on handling charges instead of pursuing enforcement
initiatives. Meanwhile, its critics have highlighted this focus by
constantly hammering the EEOC on how it handles charges. Also,
because of the overall political nature of the agency and the more
political nature of its funding, financial support by Congress has
focused on tackling charge processing issues and limiting
enforcement initiatives. So the initial compromise that stripped
down the EEOC to an agency which merely receives charges,
investigates them and attempts to conciliate them has limited any
efforts to strengthen the EEOC's enforcement impact.
Thus, the bane of the EEOC's existence over time has become
its backlog of charges. In 1995, when the charge backlog reached
an all-time high of more than 100,000 charges, the EEOC received
a tremendous amount of criticism as an agency where justice
delayed became justice denied.8 Some commentators even
suggested that the EEOC should get out of the business of charge
processing.9 Most of these criticisms focused on the EEOC's
handling of charges at a time when the EEOC's backlog reached
staggering proportions. Given its current efforts to reduce the
backlog and the inherent nature of the charge process as it relates
to the EEOC's enforcement activities, it would be difficult-if not
political suicide-to suggest that the EEOC completely abandon
charge processing without establishing a viable alternative.1 °
Even before the staggering numbers in 1995, the EEOC
battled to keep its backlog of charges manageable. It has vacillated
8. Lamont E. Stallworth & Linda K. Stroh, Who is Seeking to Use ADR?
Why Do They Choose to Do So?, 51 DIsp. RESOL. J. 30, 30-31 (1996) (noting the
tremendous hardships placed on claimants by the EEOC's backlog and discussing
how justice may be denied due to the increasing backlog).
9. See, e.g., Maurice E. R. Munroe, The EEOC: Pattern and Practice
Imperfect, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 219, 219 (1995) (stating that "race
discrimination in employment remains pervasive despite three decades of
government effort" and asserting that the EEOC has been "constrained to focus
on processing individual charges of discrimination" rather that being able to
"concentrate on combating broader unlawful practices"); Selmi, supra note 2, at
57-64 (reviewing the overall ineffectiveness of the EEOC and suggesting that it
should be disbanded or that its duties and functions be significantly altered).
Other commentators have made serious criticisms of the EEOC. See generally
Elizabeth Chambliss, Title VII as a Displacement of Conflict, 6 TEMPLE POL. &
Civ. RTs L. REV. 1 (1997) (criticizing the EEOC's role in displacing or denying the
pursuit of conflicts in the court system and thereby hindering enforcement);
Ronald Turner, A Look at Title VII's Regulatory Regime, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
219 (1994) (arguing that Title VII has failed to meet its goals and aspirations due
to its limited enforcement mechanisms); see also Stallworth & Stroh, supra note 8,
at 31 (noting the tremendous hardships placed on claimants by the EEOC's
backlog).
10. See infra Part V.
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from periods of focusing on high quality investigation of every
charge to limited investigation with a significant focus on reducing
the backlog. This cyclical problem of balancing high quality
investigation with reducing its backlog of charges has kept the
EEOC from becoming a more powerful enforcement agency
because the focus, funding and resources have not been dedicated
to enforcement initiatives.
Over the last five years, the EEOC has focused on reducing the
outrageous backlog that existed in 1995. It has made remarkable
progress while attempting to focus on many enforcement initiatives.
Although the EEOC has now significantly reduced its backlog,"
Congress has stepped into the fray and tied the hands of the EEOC
in its efforts to become a more consistent enforcement agency. By
not providing adequate funding or by tying the funding to promises
to limit its enforcement initiatives, Congress has stopped legitimate
enforcement activity and even stymied important initiatives that
were cutting the EEOC's backlog and allowing the EEOC to limit
its focus on charge processing.
Congress repeatedly uses its funding decisions to stifle the
EEOC from becoming a world class enforcement agency. With just
enough financial support to barely operate, the EEOC will
undoubtedly continue to be criticized for not spending more time
investigating charges, despite limited resources and growing
responsibilities.12 Under these circumstances, charge processing will
11. The EEOC reduced its backlog to an all-time low of 34,300 by the end of
fiscal year 2000. See Montwieler, supra note 2. Nevertheless, the total amount of
money collected by the EEOC for victims of discrimination decreased from the
1999 fiscal year. Id.
12. The federal courts have assumed that it is the EEOC's primary role to
process charges to the point of effectively screening out meaningless cases from
the court system. See Turner, supra note 2, at 467-68 (discussing efforts by the
federal courts to limit Title VII cases and criticism by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts which called "for the EEOC to take a closer look at
employment discrimination charges before issuing 'right-to-sue' letters to charging
parties," because federal judges believed that "[i]f more careful administrative
scrutiny [by the EEOC] were mandated, the number of EEO cases requiring
federal court action might be reduced"). The National Employment Law
Association, a major advocate for employee's rights, quickly responded to the
federal court challenges to the EEOC by arguing that the EEOC should not be
given additional responsibilities before allowing claims to be brought in court. Id.
at 468. The reality is that the statutory scheme of Title VII calls for the federal
courts to be the final arbiters of employment discrimination claims. If one assumes
that the EEOC is to play a major role in screening out meaningless cases through
its charge processing function, then the EEOC truly carries an enormous burden
both politically and in terms of financial resources. If the EEOC is considered to
be an agency that only enforces the law-much like the Justice Department-then
the EEOC could focus on major enforcement initiatives.
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remain the focus of the agency over any enforcement initiatives.
Nevertheless, the EEOC continues to put a positive spin on its
charge processing and enforcement efforts under these difficult
circumstances. The EEOC issues a yearly report, the most recent
of which indicating that it has reduced its backlog to longtime lows
and that it is responsible for all-time highs in the amount of money
that it has helped bring to victims of employment discrimination. 3
After more than thirty-five years of existence and the quickly-
approaching thirty year anniversary of the amendment that was
intended to transform the EEOC from being a "toothless tiger"of
an enforcement agency," the EEOC must now adopt new para-
digms for enforcement. Those new paradigms must concentrate on
limiting or removing any ongoing focus on charge processing and
switching the focus to long-term enforcement initiatives. To
accomplish that objective, this Article proposes that the EEOC
outsource"' a significant portion of its charge processing respon-
sibilities to private mediation, an informal process by which a
neutral party works with the interested parties to craft a mutually
agreeable resolution to their dispute. 6 Then the EEOC can start to
13. See EEOC Fiscal Year 2000 Accomplishments Report Shows Important
Progress on Multiple Fronts, at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/1-18-01.html (Jan. 18,
2001) (describing a seventeen-year low in charge processing backlog, record-high
monetary benefits obtained through administrative channels, as well as other
positive results from fiscal year 2000).
14. Throughout this Article, the EEOC is referred to as a "toothless tiger" of
an agency. Alfred Blumrosen, one of the EEOC's first officials, referred to the
EEOC as such when it started in 1965. See ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, BLACK
EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 59 (1971).
15. The term "outsource" in this Article means attempting to transfer internal
EEOC governmental work (charge processing) to external private sources (outside
mediators) that will perform the work so that it does not need to be completed
internally. Another term for this type of action is "privatization." See Michael
Glanzer, Union Strategies in Privatizations: Shakespeare-Inspired Alternatives, 64
ALB. L. REV. 437, 440-58 (2000) (discussing governmental decisions to outsource
or privatize certain services to reduce overall costs and promote efficiency).
16. See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies,
and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 7, 17-38
(1996) (describing various mediation techniques). Mediation has become the
preferred option for resolving litigation disputes. See generally Lisa Brennan,
What Lawyers Like: Mediation, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 15, 1999, at Al (describing a 1999
survey of attorneys conducted by the American Arbitration Association and the
National Law Journal finding that sixty-nine percent of litigators and eighty-eight
percent of in-house counsel prefer using mediation to resolve disputes); see also
John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in
Mediation, 5 HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 137, 171-76 (2000) (referring to study
of outside counsel, in-house counsel and corporate executives demonstrating that
all three groups think favorably of using mediation to resolve business disputes);
Homer C. LaRue, The Changing Workplace Environment in the New Millennium:
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shift the focus of its budgeted employees and its fixed expenses"
ADR is a Dominant Trend in the Workplace, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 453
(discussing the use of ADR including mediation as a tool to handle workplace
disputes); Nancy H. Rogers & Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase
the Use of Mediation and to Encourage Direct and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST.
J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 831, 834 (1998) (encouraging the general use of mediation for
dispute resolution). But see Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in
Mediation: A Guiding Principle For Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 775, 775-81 (1999) (criticizing the increasing use of mediation when
the choice to use mediation and the resulting settlement agreement were not based
on informed consent). To avoid risks associated with a lack of informed consent,
this Article proposes that employees and employers be required to participate in
mediation only if the resolution is voluntary and based on informed consent. See
infra Part V.C.
Mediation is also gradually increasing as a preferred option for resolving
employment discrimination disputes. See Aimee Gourlay & Jenelle Soderquist,
Mediation in Employment Cases is Too Little Too Late: An Organizational Conflict
Management Perspective on Resolving Disputes, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 261-62
(1998) (encouraging use of mediation to resolve employment disputes especially if
companies change their culture of conflict resolution); Johnathan R. Harkavy,
Privatizing Workplace Justice: The Advent of Mediation in Resolving Sexual
Harassment Disputes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 150-56, 168-69 (1999) (tracing
the emergence of mediation as a method to resolve employment disputes and
supporting the use of mediation in resolving sexual harassment claims); Ann C.
Hodges, Mediation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 30 GA. L. REV. 431
(1996) (describing the benefits of using mediation to resolve disability
discrimination claims brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act);
Michael J. Yelnosky, Title VII, Mediation, and Collective Action, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REV. 583, 597-604 (identifying the potential value of mediating Title VII claims);
Carrie A. Bond, Note, Shattering the Myth: Mediating Sexual Harassment Disputes
in the Workplace, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2489, 2510-33 (1997) (advocating use of
mediation in sexual harassment disputes). The EEOC's mediation program for
employment discrimination disputes has been highly touted. See Nancy
Montwieler, EEOC's New Nationwide Mediation Plan Offers Option of Informal
Settlements, 29 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) C-1 (Feb. 12, 1999) (discussing the
EEOC's efforts to increase the use of mediation to resolve charges and how the
EEOC's mediation program operates). I have asserted that more empirical studies
and critical analysis of mediation programs involving employment disputes must
still be conducted. See Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer
Advantage From Using Mandatory Arbitration For Discrimination Claims, 31
RUTGERS L.J. 399, 471 (2000) (asserting that scholars must shift from analyzing
arbitration and focus on understanding "mediation's effect on resolving
employment discrimination disputes"); see also Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR: Where
Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1055, 1058-59 (1996) (criticizing
the lack of scholarly discourse and critique of ADR with respect to a general
imbalance in power for those who may not benefit from an informal dispute
resolution option, especially those lacking power because of racial, gender or
economic status). But see Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical and
Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO STATE J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 735 (2001) (criticizing the "call for more such [empirical] studies"
and suggesting that "we should be skeptical of declarations that empirical studies
'prove' one side of the debate to be correct").
17. Apparently, "eighty-four percent of the [EEOC's] overall budget consists
of fixed costs, such as staff salaries, benefits, and related expenses such as rent and
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from charge processing to developing stronger enforcement
initiatives, especially with tester programs1 8 that will help tackle the
systemic wage discrimination19 barriers that exist in our country.
The goal of this Article is to promote critical thinking about
the practical effects that mandatory and private mediation of
EEOC charges will have in making the EEOC a stronger enforce-
ment agency. Part II of this Article discusses the historical
development of the EEOC and its lack of enforcement power. Part
utilities." See EEOC List of "Major Accomplishments" Cites Mediation, Small
Business, 13 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-3 (Jan. 19, 2001). The budget for the
private mediation program proposed in this Article should be set for the next five
years and not considered a part of the EEOC's budget. See infra Parts V.C and
VI.
18. Testing usually involves sending a pair of similarly qualified individuals
from different protected classes to apply for the same position, and then observing
whether the minority or female applicant receives less favorable results than her
white or male counterpart to "test" whether an entity is discriminating. A number
of tester programs have been quite successful in exposing housing discrimination.
Expansion of those programs to employment discrimination cases would be
helpful. See Urban Institute Researchers Urge Expansion of Testing to Unearth
Bias, 41 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-9 (Mar. 3, 1999). Historically, the EEOC has
been supportive of the use of testers to ferret out discrimination and has offered
funds to private organizations in Chicago, Illinois and Washington, D.C. to start
tester programs. Also, the EEOC has issued a policy statement supporting the use
of testers. See EEOC Notice 915.002, at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/testers.html
(May 22, 1996). The EEOC has a "longheld position that 'testers' have legal
standing to file charges and litigate claims of employment discrimination." EEOC
Issues New Guidance on Legal Standing of "Testers," at http://www.eeoc.gov
/press/5-24-96a.html (May 24, 1996). However, Congress has prevented the EEOC
from pursuing any longstanding "tester" initiatives by limiting funding. See
Deborah Billings, Congressional Appropriators Moving to Bar EEOC Pursuit of
Employment Tester Program, 131 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) D-7 (July 9, 1998)
(describing efforts by GOP appropriators to link any overall increase in funding
for the EEOC to an order or agreement "not to pursue any policy which would use
testers as a standard practice"). For several critical analyses of tester programs,
see Michael J. Yelnosky, Filling an Enforcement Void: Using Testers to Uncover
and Remedy Discrimination in Hiring for Lower-Skilled, Entry-Level Jobs, 26 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 403 (1993); Leroy D. Clark, Employment Discrimination
Testing: Theories of Standing and a Reply To Professor Yelnosky, 28 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1 (1994); Michael J. Yelnosky, Salvaging the Opportunity: A Response to
Professor Clark, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 151 (1994).
19. Male workers consistently earn at least twenty-five percent more than
similarly situated female workers. See Pam Ginsbach, Household Income Rises for
Fifth Year as Poverty Rate Falls to 20-Year Low, 188 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) D-1
(Sept. 27, 2000) (noting that the gap in pay between women and men in 2000
increased to the point where women earned seventy-two cents for each dollar
earned by males, a two percent drop from the all-time high of seventy-four cents
for each dollar, which occurred in 1996). The EEOC has made it a priority to
investigate pay equity issues for women and minorities. See EEOC Focuses on
Pay Equity at Meeting in Philadelphia, at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/4-15-99.html
(Apr. 15, 1999).
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III addresses the significant accomplishment of amending Title VII
to give the EEOC enforcement powers in 1972. Part IV examines
how the EEOC has continued to be bogged down by the initial
label of being a charge-handling agency and how that label has
allowed critics to limit the EEOC's enforcement power. Part V of
this Article proposes a simple amendment to EEOC procedures
and the congressional approval of legislation that would provide for
private mandatory mediation of EEOC charges. ° In Part VI, the
20. There are numerous critics of mandatory mediation programs, but most of
their criticisms involve its application to domestic relations proceedings. See, e.g.,
Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power,
40 BuFF. L. REV. 441, 441-46 (1992); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:
Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1547, 1549-51 (1991); Andree G.
Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation for Battered Women, 15 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 272, 272-73 (1992); Craig McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers:
Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation,
79 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1394-96 (1995); Mary Pat Treuthart, In Harm's Way?
Family Mediation and the Role of the Attorney Advocate, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 717, 721-31 (1993); cf. Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Voluntarism: Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993
J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 46 (criticizing mandatory ADR because it creates an additional
layer of transactions and costs for litigants). Results from programs not involving
domestic relations appear to be less concerning. See Roselle L. Wissler, The
Effects of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on the Experience of Small
Claims and Common Pleas Courts, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 565, 566 (1997)
(reporting studies in small claims and common pleas courts contexts showing little
support for claim that parties are pressured to accept unfair settlements in
mandatory mediation). The mandatory mediation proposed in this Article would
require that the parties meet pursuant to an order of the EEOC, and during that
meeting would have a duty to try to reach a mutual agreement with the help of a
neutral mediator. See infra Part V. Actual agreement, however, would not be
required. Id. This is similar to the duty to bargain in good faith under the
National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2001); see also Nolan-Haley,
supra note 16, at 803 (noting that "mandatory mediation programs generally
ignore any requirements for consent and specify some form of good faith
participation"); IND. R. ADR 2.1 (parties are required to mediate in good faith but
are not required to settle). If the parties cannot reach an agreement, the charge
would come back to the EEOC for further processing. I also view this type of
arrangement as similar to a fact finding conference which frequently occurs under
many state administrative regimes enforcing employment discrimination laws. See,
e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 60Y-5.003 (2001) (fact finding conference under
the Florida Human Rights Act); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56, § 2520.440 (2001)
(describing fact finding conferences under the Illinois Human Rights Act). For
example, under the Illinois Department of Human Rights regulations, the agency
"may convene a fact-finding conference for the purpose of obtaining evidence,
identifying the issues in dispute, ascertaining the positions of the parties and
exploring the possibility of a negotiated settlement." Id. § 2520.440(a). The
parties are given ten days notice to appear at the conference. Id. Although
attorneys may appear, it is solely up to the investigator to determine what
witnesses are to be heard during the conference. Id. §§ 2520.440(b)-(c). Also, the
Department may dismiss the charge, if the complainant fails to attend, or default
the charge, if the respondent fails to attend, unless that party can show good cause
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Article argues that congressional efforts to prevent certain EEOC
initiatives-including private mandatory mediation-by reducing
overall EEOC funding should be limited to actual amendments to
Title VII. Congress should not use the annual budgeting process to
hold certain EEOC enforcement initiatives hostage in exchange for
money needed just to allow the agency to function. The Article
concludes in Part VII that private mandatory mediation will assist
the EEOC by creating a new paradigm for long-term enforcement
initiatives.
1I. The Creation of the EEOC: Establishing a Toothless Tiger of
an Agency
A. Efforts to Address Employment Discrimination Prior to Title
VII
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of
1964 into law on July 2, 1964.2' Title VII of that statute establishes
that "it shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire,
discharge, limit, segregate, classify, or otherwise discriminate
against any individual, with respect to wages, privileges, and other
terms of employment because of that individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. ' '2   Title VII was not the first
for the failure to attend the conference. Id. § 2520.440(d)(1). Florida has similar
fact finding conference provisions under its Commission on Human Relations
statute. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 60Y-5.003 (2001). Many other state anti-
discrimination laws provide administrative regimes requiring parties to attend a
fact finding conference. See, e.g., MINN. R. 5000.0510 (2001); N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 465.6 (2001); 40 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 327.2(e)-(1) (West 2001).
The EEOC did use fact finding conferences when former Chairwoman Eleanor
Holmes Norton made them a primary focus based upon her experience with the
conferences under New York's anti-discrimination laws. See McDermott, supra
note 7 (click on link to Part IV.C). When Clarence Thomas became Chair of the
EEOC, he stopped requiring fact finding conferences and the EEOC has not
reinstated the practice. See id. The fact finding conference and rapid charge
processing program used by Chairwoman Norton is described in more detail in
Section IV.
21. See Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in
pertinent part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-17 (2001)). For a discussion of the
events leading to the enactment of Title VII, see Sovern, supra note 6; Blumrosen,
supra note 14. In 1965, Professor Blumrosen, as a result of his study of the New
Jersey Division on Civil Rights, was asked to help establish the EEOC, and has
been involved in the implementation of Title VII since that time. See William L.
Robinson, Statements Favoring EEOC's Use of Goals and Timetables Before
House Labor Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities, in 50 DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) F-1 (Mar. 14, 1986).
22. See supra note 21.
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attempt by the federal government to address employment
discrimination. Rather, Title VII represented the fulfillment of two
prior decades of unsuccessful efforts to enact fair employment
legislation as Congress considered and rejected more than 200 fair
employment bills.'
Before Title VII, a number of presidential executive orders
had established a policy against discrimination in employment by
federal contractors. In 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
issued an executive order prohibiting employment discrimination
by federal contractors. President Roosevelt issued the order at the
urging of A. Philip Randolph and other African-American leaders
who had organized a mass civil rights march on Washington, D.C.
to protest the exclusion of African-American workers from jobs in
the defense and other industries.24 Issuance of this order quelled
the efforts to organize that march.25  Specifically, that order
prohibited employment discrimination "against all workers in
defense industries" on the basis of "race, creed, color, or national
origin" and it created a five-person Fair Employment Practice
Commission (FEPC) to "receive and investigate complaints of
discrimination" and "to take appropriate steps" in obtaining
compliance.26 On May 27, 1943, President Roosevelt increased the
jurisdiction of the FEPC to include all employers involved in
production of war materials or support for such production
regardless of whether they had contracts with the federal
government.1  Other executive orders addressing employment
discrimination were subsequently issued before Title VII's
passage.'
The year after Title VII passed, President Johnson issued
Executive Order 11246.29 That order was intended to strengthen
"prohibitions against discrimination in government employment
and in employment by government contractors and subcontractors
23. See Sovern, supra note 6, at 61 (stating that Title VII was finally passed
"[a]fter over twenty years of deliberation on dozens of bills").
24. HERBERT HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM,
VOLUME 1: RACE, WORK, AND THE LAW, 178-79 (1977); see also Sovern, supra
note 6, at 9.
25. Hill, supra note 24, at 178-79.
26. Id. at 179 (citing 3 C.F.R. § 957 (1941)).
27. Id. at 179.
28. Id. at 379-81 (citing executive orders by the Truman, Eisenhower,
Kennedy, and Johnson Administrations).
29. Id. at 380.
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and it required equality of job opportunity for federally assisted
construction projects."30
B. The Legislative Attempts by Republicans and Southern
Democrats to Block Title VII and the Compromises Leading to
Its Passage
Throughout its history, the United States has been unable to
face issues of race head on and has relied on countless compromises
that have only masked the problem." As an example of this
premise, Title VII, as originally envisioned by certain members of
Congress, was not intended to achieve equality in the workplace.32
30. Id.
31. Examples of these compromises can be found in this country's
Constitution. See generally Paul Finkelman, Teaching Slavery in American
Constitutional Law, 34 AKRON L. REV. 261 (2000) (describing how slavery was an
important aspect of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 and how the Three-
Fifths clause, the protection of the African slave trade until at least 1808, and the
Fugitive Slave Trade clause were obvious accommodations to the needs of the
South that were not directly addressed until the Civil War, despite attempts to
further compromise before then with the Missouri Compromise in 1820 and the
Compromise of 1850). At the formation of the Constitution, the states essentially
entered into a Constitutional compact to not address the eradication of slavery
despite it being a concept that was inimical to the Declaration of Independence,
upon which this country was founded. See generally Michael Kent Curtis, The
Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in
1835-37, 89 Nw. U.L. REV. 785, 790-91 (1995) (explaining that many believed that
the slavery compromise in the Constitution was part of a compact between the
northern and the southern states). That Constitutional compromise only led to
other compromises like the Missouri Compromise, which allowed slavery to go
forward in Missouri as long as it did not go forward in certain states acquired as
part of the Louisiana purchase. Id. at 792. Eventually, the compromises and the
deals that placated the South could no longer last as the Civil War erupted. Today,
quite possibly, the compromises involved in passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964
may no longer be acceptable. See Finkelman, supra at 266-67 (describing the long
term effects of slavery in the United States, especially in how it shaped the
Constitution, and how despite congressional efforts to make the Constitution
color-blind, race still matters in our everyday life, as the government has been
unable to eradicate race as a factor of injustice in our society). Those
compromises, hopefully, will not lead to a modern-day race war over the struggle
for equality. See generally CARL T. ROWAN, THE COMING RACE WAR IN AMERICA
(1995) (claiming that growing racial tensions and injustices in our society, along
with a lack of success within the legal system, may lead to a race war).
32. At the beginning of the legislative effort to pass Title VII and create the
EEOC, South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, then a Democrat, admitted that
the southerners who wanted to defeat the legislation had their "backs ... to the
wall," but they were "not without weapons with which [they] [could] fight back"
because southerners chaired twelve of the eighteen committees in the Senate and
twelve of the twenty-one committees in the House. Whalen & Whalen, supra note
6, at 19. In other words, these southern members of Congress would use their
power to prevent the legislation from passing. Id.
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Rather, Title VII represented significant compromises aimed at
placating the whims of the southern congressmen who controlled its
passage.33 Despite an August 1963 march on Washington, D.C. by
civil rights leaders and their insistence that any civil rights bill
passed by Congress must include a strong agency like the FEPC
and other enforcement powers, President John F. Kennedy
remained pessimistic about the chances of such strong legislation
passing under the scrutiny of the Republicans and the southern
Democrats in the Congress.4 President Kennedy's concerns proved
true; even after his tragic death, compromises offered to get the
support of certain Republicans and southern Democrats led to a
focus on private enforcement by individuals and the creation of a
watered down government agency with no enforcement authority.35
33. See Whalen & Whalen, supra note 6, at 22-23 (noting the maneuvering of
President Kennedy to get a civil fights bill passed). President Kennedy rebuked
efforts by African-American civil rights leader Roy Wilkins, executive secretary of
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), who
demanded on behalf of the Leadership Council on Civil Rights that the bill which
became Title VII must include a strong enforcement agency called the EEOC. Id.
President Kennedy did not pursue a strong enforcement agency because he
"attempted to placate" Wilbur Mills, the chairman of the Ways and Means
committee, a southern Democrat from Arkansas. Id. Kennedy believed that his
tax bill had priority over the civil rights bill and that if the civil rights bill continued
on, Mills and the Ways and Means Committee would hinder enactment of
Kennedy's tax bill. Id. (suggesting that Kennedy had even asked the Democrats to
stall on the civil rights bill until his tax reform bill made it out of the Ways and
Means Committee).
34. Id. The march on Washington involved the famous "I Have A Dream"
speech by Martin Luther King. Id. at 26. President Kennedy met with ten of the
civil rights leaders shortly after the speech, including Martin Luther King, A. Philip
Randolph, Whitney Young (then executive director of the Urban League) and
Roy Wilkins. Id. When pressed by these civil rights leaders to ensure that any
civil rights bill would be strengthened by an agency and the Justice Department's
authority to intervene, President Kennedy analyzed the votes that would be
needed from each state for it to pass and surmised that the southern Democrats
would not vote for it. Id. President Kennedy believed that there would need to be
compromises made to get the number of Republican votes necessary to pass any
civil rights legislation, regardless of the opposition from southern Democrats. Id.
at 26, 39.
35. This Article is not suggesting that governmental enforcement is better than
private enforcement; both mechanisms are valuable. See Robert Belton, A
Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 961 (1978) (describing the role of
private litigation in the enforcement of Title VII and arguing that scholars have
underestimated the impact of private litigation on the enforcement of Title VII);
Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private
Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1384 (2000)
(proposing that private enforcement of civil rights laws would be strengthened by
allowing governmental agencies to deputize individuals or private organizations to
pursue civil rights violations); Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of
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Accordingly, the reason for the EEOC's lack of enforcement
power was due solely to the compromise "frenzy" fostered by those
vehemently opposed to eradicating employment discrimination.36
Title VII was initially intended to be a statute with significant
enforcement goals accomplished through a powerful administrative
agency.37 Specifically, last minute compromises on the congress-
ional floor led to a significant amendment with respect to the
creation of the EEOC. The bill, as it was originally reported out of
the House Judiciary Committee, called for the creation of a federal
agency, patterned after the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), to deal with employment discrimination. 8  Under the
House version of the bill, the EEOC was to have broad invest-
igatory powers similar to the Federal Trade Commission, but the
Senate limited this power and as a compromise, the House agreed.39
Also, the EEOC was to be composed of an administrator and a
five-member board and was to be empowered to issue cease and
desist orders which would be factually conclusive if later reviewed
by a court. However, because of the last-minute deals' that
Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1402-
05 (1998) (analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of private versus public
enforcement of civil rights laws and suggesting that reliance on government agency
enforcement is fruitless).
36. See Janice R. Franke, Does Title VII Contemplate Personal Liability for
Employee/Agent Defendants, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 39, 40-41 (1994) (noting that
"[olne pitfall of the compromise frenzy [leading up to Title VII's passage] was that
the remedial section of the statute, originally written to provide for judicial relief
incidental to central agency enforcement, was adopted without further conference
or significant debate."). These changes to the enforcement principles behind Title
VII were "last-minute compromises made on the floor of the chamber." Id. at 40.
37. Franke, supra note 36, at 40. The agency that eventually became the
EEOC was initially expected to be based on the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB): an agency with cease and desist powers, the authority to hold hearings
and issue enforceable orders and only limited judicial review of its decisions. Id. at
41-42; see also Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts and Employment
Discrimination Policy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory
Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 51, 58-59 (describing same).
38. See James E. Jones, Jr., Some Reflections on Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 at Twenty, 36 MERCER L. REV. 813, 820 (1985); see also White, supra
note 37, at 59 (describing Senate action to remove prosecutorial authority from
Title VII bill); Whalen & Whalen, supra note 6, at 37-38 (noting that the bill that
came out of the House committee established the EEOC and empowered it to
investigate charges of discrimination in firms with twenty-five or more employees
and to issue judicially enforceable orders). At least one commentator has
suggested that the decision to bring a "strong bill out of subcommittee" was part of
a plan to "then trade away those sections most objectionable to the southern
Democrats and conservative Republicans on the full committee" in order to get
some form of civil rights legislation passed. Whalen & Whalen, supra note 6, at 37.
39. See Sovern, supra note 6, at 85.
40. Description of the attempts to defeat the Title VII legislation have reached
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stripped the EEOC of its enforcement powers, the revised bill
passed in the House with little debate or discussion despite the
wholesale emasculation of the EEOC's enforcement powers.4' It is
believed that most of that EEOC power was compromised in order
to avoid a Republican filibuster in the Senate.
Concerns about enforcement mechanisms of Title VII became
a prominent bargaining chip in getting the legislation passed. These
concerns of mostly southern and Republican congressional mem-
bers generally followed two threads: 1) beliefs that legitimate
businesses and their practices would be trampled by a strong
government agency with a mission to enforce anti-discrimination
laws; and 2) direct opposition to any form of civil rights legislation.43
Specifically, some senators feared that business and free enterprise
would be harmed by having strong government regulation of the
legendary proportions. Some have argued that southern opponents of the bill
were so determined to defeat the legislation that they proposed a last minute
amendment adding the word "sex" to the list of protected classes only one day
before the House vote with the hope that this addition would seal the legislation's
failure. See Leland Ware, The Civil Rights Act of 1990: A Dream Deferred, 10 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 1, 6 (1991) (describing legislative history of Title VII).
Professor Ware also notes that a plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court, per Justice
William J. Brennan in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, confirmed the understanding
that "sex" was thrown into the statute at the last minute as an attempt to thwart
the entire passage of Title VII. Id. (citing 490 U.S. 228, 244 n.9 (1989)). See also
White, supra note 37, at 60 n.57 (noting that the inclusion of "sex" to Title VII was
one of the "more celebrated of the amendments passed that day"). However,
there are others who claim that the insertion of the term "sex" was part of a
massive effort by feminist organizations that had failed in their attempt to get
support for an equal rights amendment and saw the inclusion of "sex" in Title VII
as a major victory. See generally Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke:
A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137 (1997) (arguing that those who
have consistently alleged that the word "sex" was thrown into Title VII as an
afterthought or an attempt to prevent the entire bill from being passed are
mistaken because it was part of a major effort by the feminist groups that helped
secure its passage). In any event, the purported plan of adding "sex" at the last
minute to defeat the legislation failed when the House passed Title VII, as
amended and with "sex" included, the day after the amendment was offered.
41. Franke, supra note 36, at 40-42.
42. See Timothy Lionel Jenkins, Study of Federal Effort to End Job Bias: A
History, A Status Report, and A Prognosis, 14 How. L.J. 259, 279 (1968); see
generally Whalen & Whalen, supra note 6; Jones, supra note 38; see also Pre 1965:
Events Leading To The Creation of the EEOC, at http://www.eeoc.gov/35th
/pre1965 (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
43. See Whalen & Whalen, supra note 6, at 26, 37-39; Chambliss, supra note 9,
at 4-9; Laurie M. Stegman, Note, An Administrative Battle of the Forms: The
EEOC's Intake Questionnaire and Charge of Discrimination, 91 MICH. L. REV.
124, 128-34 (1992).
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workplace that would "subject a great part of American industry to
bureaucratic whims, prejudices and caprices." 44 Another senator
commented:
I predict this bill will never be enforced without turning our
nation into a police state.... [T]his Commission will have
virtually $10 million a year to create a big brother bureaucracy
to meddle in the affairs of virtually every business or
industry... in the United States.
By focusing on private enforcement instead of strong agency
enforcement, the proponents of civil rights legislation won enough
votes from northern Republicans to overcome staunch southern
senate opposition.4 Thus, the commitment to an agency with only
power to seek informal conciliation rather than any strong
enforcement was a key part of the compromise and believed by
proponents of the legislation as a necessary component to Title
VII's passage.
Of course, from the proponents' perspective, it was also a
compromise that ended the longest filibuster in the history of
Congress.47 Proponents resolved the conflict over Title VII's
enactment by pretending that the EEOC would be fine with just
investigating charges and conciliating them without enforcing its
findings. They accepted this compromise under the faulty premise
that employers should not be forced into compliance by a powerful
government agency and accepted the belief that it would be better
to have the statute passed with a weak agency rather than not pass
at all. As another congressman noted, the proponents for civil
rights legislation recognized this result and they still went ahead
with the weak regulatory scheme:
I must say, in all candor, that we have taken [T]itle VII and
rewritten it, believing that the prime responsibility for action
and enforcement is at the State and local level, recognizing that
this is not the fast approach, recognizing that this is a
concession-and I would be the last to say that it was not-and
recognizing that in a sense we have weakened the bill.48
44. Chambliss, supra note 9, at 5 (quoting Senator Tower from the legislative
history).
45. Id. (quoting Senator Johnston from the legislative history).
46. Id. at 7.
47. See id. at 5 n.12; see generally Whalen & Whalen, supra note 6; Hill, supra
note 4.
48. Chambliss, supra note 9, at 8 n.37 (quoting Senator Humphrey from the
legislative history).
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So it is true that a significant aspect of Title VII was that it
created the EEOC to administer the law." Unfortunately, it is
generally understood that the most significant aspect of the decision
to create the EEOC was the accompanying decision by Congress
that it would not provide the EEOC with any enforcement
authority." Accordingly, the EEOC and many scholars recognized
from the very beginning that it was a "toothless tiger"'" of an
52
agency.
III. The Equal Employment Act of 1972: Attempting to Provide
the Tiger With Some Teeth
In 1971, Congress responded to the number of critics regarding
the EEOC's lack of enforcement power by conducting public
hearings on proposed amendments to Title VII. From those
hearings, Congress concluded that although the "EEOC has made
an heroic attempt to reduce the incidence of employment discrimin-
ation in the nation.., employment discrimination is even more
49. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-17 (2001).
50. This differed markedly from the NLRB and other state employment
discrimination commissions that existed at the time of the EEOC's creation. See
Selmi, supra note 2, at 5 & n.14. Compared with the NLRB, which has
administrative enforcement authority, the EEOC is a weak agency. See Jones,
supra note 38, at 820; Blumrosen, supra note 14, at 57-58. Furthermore, some
"pessimists" believed that Title VII's emphasis on private litigation as a result of
too many Democratic compromises in Congress was evidence of the defeat of the
civil rights movement. See Jones, supra note 38, at 819-20 (identifying Professor
James Jones as one of many who were "bitterly disappointed with the compromise
that emerged from Congress").
51. As mentioned supra note 14, the origin of the term "toothless tiger" is
attributed to Professor Alfred Blumrosen, who was the first chief of conciliations
for the EEOC. See Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REv. 921, 957 & n.177 (1993) (citing Alfred Blumrosen as
the source of the "toothless tiger" moniker). Even the EEOC has referred to
itself as a "toothless tiger" before Title VII was amended in 1972 to give it
enforcement powers. See 1965-1971: A "Toothless Tiger" Helps Shape the Law
and Educate the Public, at http:/www.eeoc.gov/35th/1965-71 (last visited Nov. 10,
2001).
52. When Title VII was passed in 1964, Columbia Law Professor Michael
Sovern called the EEOC a "poor, feebled thing" that only has the "power to
conciliate but not to compel." See Sovern, supra note 6, at 205. A number of other
critiques of Title VII have condemned its failure to provide the EEOC with
enforcement powers when it began. See Hill, supra note 4, at 7, 51-52; Jones, supra
note 38, at 819-20 & n.32 (describing the compromise involved with the bill that
became Title VII and noting that the bill was believed to be "far short of that
hoped for" because instead of creating an exclusive federal commission with cease
and desist powers similar to those of the NLRB, it only granted the newly-created
EEOC a right to investigate and conciliate but not the right to prosecute cases and
seek enforcement; this was left up to individuals who brought lawsuits).
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pervasive and tenacious than... Congress had assumed... [when]
it passed the 1964 Act."53 Also, it became evident that widespread
discrimination existed and little progress in eradicating employment
discrimination had occurred since enactment of Title VII.
4
Congress awakened from its earlier slumber to recognize that "rely-
ing on conciliation and voluntary compliance was inadequate.
5
Accordingly, in 1972, Congress agreed to give the EEOC
litigation authority to enforce its administrative findings by private
lawsuit. But even with new legislation in 1972, Congress still failed
to give the EEOC cease and desist power under the amendments to
Title VII created by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972.56 Nevertheless, these amendments were necessary to ensure
53. The 1970s: The "Toothless Tiger" Gets Its Teeth-A New Era of
Enforcement, at http://www.eeoc.gov/35th/1970s (last visited Nov. 10, 2001).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified in pertinent part in title 42
of the United States Code). For the full text of the Act, see http://www.eeoc.gov
/35th/thelaw/eeo_1972.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2001). Although beyond the
scope of this Article, it is important to point out that even the legislation intended
to amend Title VII to address the EEOC's lack of enforcement power was subject
to another compromise. Conservative members of Congress joined with what
might appear to be an unlikely partner-labor unions-in an effort to stop the
legislation intended to provide the EEOC with broad enforcement authorities. See
Hill, supra note 4, at 32-51 (discussing efforts by the AFL-CIO to block legislation
authorizing cease and desist powers for the EEOC, unless all powers of the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) were also transferred to the EEOC).
The OFCC is now called the Office for Federal Contracts Compliance Programs
(OFCCP). Under Executive Order 11246, the OFCC was regulating construction
trade unions under the AFL-CIO that had federal construction contracts. The
AFL-CIO did not like this agency's powerful authority, especially because the
agency had been challenging most of the discriminatory seniority provisions of the
construction trade unions and threatening to use its authority to cancel those
contracts. Id. at 38-42. Initially, in response to concerns about the EEOC and the
OFCC being opponents of the unions, the AFL-CIO asked that any legislation
giving the EEOC cease and desist power only be given in exchange for a limit on
the private right of an individual to sue. Id. at 38-39. The AFL-CIO retreated
from that position, but after several attempts and with the help of Mississippi
Democrat William Colmer, they were able to prevent the EEOC from obtaining
cease and desist authority. Id. at 46. Because Colmer was adamantly opposed to
civil rights legislation and considered it "vicious" legislation, he used his authority
as Chair of the House Rules Committee to keep the bill from getting outside of his
committee. Id. at 46-47. Eventually, through a compromise brokered by the
Nixon administration, an agreement was reached whereby the EEOC would have
the right to file private lawsuits to enforce Title VII, but not the right to issue cease
and desist orders. Id. at 49-51. The lead opponent in the Nixon administration to
the EEOC having cease and desist powers was William Rehnquist, then head of
the Office of Legal Counsel and now Chief Justice of the United States. See
White, supra note 37, at 64-66. Without cease and desist authority, the EEOC has
no power to issue an enforceable order against a party; it can only file a private
2001] PROPOSING A NEW PARADIGM FOR EEOC ENFORCEMENT 325
that employers would start to take the EEOC seriously.7 The 1972
Act also expanded the EEOC's jurisdiction by reducing the number
of employees needed to be covered by Title VII from twenty-five to
fifteen employees, allowing the EEOC to sue employers, employ-
ment agencies and unions and creating coverage under Title VII for
federal, state and local governments. 8  With this new-found
enforcement power, one would expect that the EEOC would take
the lead in enforcement of the statute. However, poor leadership,
lack of funding, expanded responsibilities and coverage and a
growing concentration on the backlog of charges became the main
focus of the 1970s.5
lawsuit to enforce the law and cause a de novo trial to be held in court-the only
entity able to determine liability under Title VII. Id. at 66, 91.
57. See Earl D. Kraus, Note, Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and
Employees: The Sixth Circuit Says The EEOC is Not Bound, 2000 J. DisP. RESOL.
187, 190.
58. See supra note 56.
59. See The 1970s: The "Toothless Tiger" Gets Its Teeth-A New Era of
Enforcement, at http://www.eeoc.gov/35th/1970s (last visited Nov. 15, 2001); see
also Hill, supra note 4, at 51-96 (criticizing the EEOC for not organizing to take
advantage of its authority to litigate, for getting bogged down in handling the
growing charge backlog, for not prioritizing any enforcement initiatives, for being
burdened by mismanagement and inept leadership, and for losing out on the
authority to issue cease and desist orders based upon general investigations of
industries, as opposed to being confined to pursuing individual charges). Other
sources explain the background for the 1972 Act. See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 3
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2139 ("[T]he machinery created by
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [was] not adequate" because the "voluntary
approach... failed to eliminate employment discrimination"). "In cases posing
the most profound consequences, [employers had] more often than not shrugged
off the [EEOC's] entreaties and relied upon the unlikelihood of the parties suing
them." S. REP. No. 92-415, at 4 (1971). The "failure to grant the EEOC
meaningful enforcement powers [was] a major flaw in the operation of Title VII."
Id. The Sixth Circuit has recently held that EEOC enforcement actions vindicate
the broader public interest in eradicating employment discrimination. See EEOC
v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 468 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that the
EEOC may proceed against an employer even though the employee who filed the
EEOC charge agreed to have her claims resolved by arbitration, because the
EEOC was not a party to the arbitration agreement and the importance of the
EEOC's independent right to file suits on behalf of the public interest would be
jeopardized if individuals could prevent suit, or the relief that the EEOC can
obtain, by agreeing to arbitrate). The scope of the EEOC's enforcement powers
will be sorely tested in front of the Supreme Court very soon when the Court
decides a case on whether the EEOC may still seek independent monetary awards
when an individual plaintiff has agreed to arbitrate a statutory employment
discrimination claim. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805 (4th Cir.
1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 1401 (2001).
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IV. The Reality of Being Considered a Charge Processor Instead
of an Enforcer: Focusing on the Tiger's Intake While Not
Allowing Its Teeth to be Exposed
As enacted in 1964, Section 706(a) of Title VII provides the
process by which an employee may initiate an employment discrim-
ination action with the EEOC: "Whenever it is charged in writing
under oath by a person claiming to be aggrieved.., that an
employer.., has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the
Commission shall... make an investigation of such charge. ' The
initial EEOC regulations stated that the charge "shall be in
writing.., and shall be sworn to by a notary public., 61
With expansion of the EEOC's enforcement power in the
1970s,62 the scope of the EEOC's charge handling functions also
expanded. The charge process can be quite complex. The EEOC
considers a charge to have been properly filed if "the Commission
receives from the person making the charge a written statement
sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally
the action or practices complained of. '63 The EEOC uses two forms
to assist in accomplishing its charge processing function, an Intake
Questionnaire and the Charge of Discrimination.6' The Intake
Questionnaire solicits informal information and the Charge of
Discrimination provides the formal information to invoke the
EEOC's processing of the charge.65 The Intake Questionnaire can
sometimes meet the timely filing requirements with the EEOC
even if the Charge has not been signed under oath before the
statute of limitations expires.' As more timely charges get filed,
60. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706, 78 Stat. 241, 259 (1964) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2001)).
61. Stegman, supra note 43, at 125 (citing prior regulation at 29 C.F.R. § 1601.9
(1991)).
62. See generally Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified in pertinent part in title 42 of the United States
Code). The 1972 Act gave the EEOC the authority to file lawsuits in federal court
to enforce its findings when it was unsuccessful in obtaining a conciliation
agreement. See id.
63. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (2001). The validity of 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b),
which also provides that a Title VII "charge may be amended to cure technical
defects or omissions, including the failure to verify the charge" will be examined
by the Supreme Court during the 2001 term. See Edelman v. Lynchburg College,
228 F.3d 503 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 2547 (2001).
64. Stegman, supra note 43, at 126.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 144-46; see also Roy L. Brooks, A Roadmap Through Title VII's
Procedural and Remedial Labyrinth, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 511, 512-13 (1995) (noting
some courts have found that an intake questionnaire may constitute a charge).
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the more resources must be employed to handle and investigate the
charges. Without adequate resources and focus, a backlog is
created.
As a response to its growing backlog in 1995, the EEOC
implemented a new charge-prioritizing process. Under this priority
charge system, each charge is placed into one of three tracks ranked
in order of importance, where:
[t]rack "A" will contain cases where there is reasonable cause
that a violation occurred, "C" cases will be those that do not
contain reasonable cause to think that a violation occurred or
where further investigation is not likely to yield a material
violation, and "B" is a temporary condition for those requiring
more investigation to determine if they belong on Track A or
C.
6 7
In June 1998, approximately three years after adopting this
new process, the EEOC announced that it had cut the backlog
nearly in half by reducing it to 58,000 cases.' One commentator has
referred to this new charge prioritizing process as a "'triage'
procedure... classifying cases as 'A,' 'B,' or 'C' priorities depend-
ing on merit and importance, and tossing out many charges after
the briefest of investigations[.]"69 This triage procedure assumes
that an "intensive initial intelligence gathering 'conversation"'
occurs.70 Relying on this initial conversation to quickly dismiss "C"
cases is a weakness in this triage procedure because everything
hinges on how well that single initial conversation goes.71 By
67. See EEOC: New Charge-Processing System Means More Action at Local
Level, Official Says, 92 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) D-9 (May 12, 1995).
68. See Nancy Montwieler, EEOC Reduces Pending Inventory By Half-to
58,000 cases-in Three Years, 157 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-1 (Aug. 14, 1998);
EEOC Statistics on Charge Receipts and Resolutions, 157 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA)
E-6 (Aug. 14, 1998).
69. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee
Discrimination Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY
L. REV. 1, 8 (1998).
70. See supra note 67, at D-9.
71. See St. Antoine, supra note 69, at 8 (noting that the EEOC is "no
salvation" for the employee with a "minimal case," as the backlog of charges is
being reduced by using the "briefest of investigations"). This suggests that the
speed with which the EEOC has reduced its backlog parallels the speed with which
victims of discrimination have lost any meaningful investigation of their charges
unless it is clear that discrimination has occurred.
EEOC guidance further explains the handling of "C" charges:
A charge may be placed in Category C and dismissed when an office
has sufficient information from which to conclude that it is not likely
that further investigation will result in a cause finding.
An office will have sufficient information when it has conducted an
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labeling them as "C" charges, quite possibly, the triage procedure
merely shifts a large number of the charges out of the system
without any investigation.72 Nevertheless, because the system has
worked so well at reducing the backlog, a large number of charges
are being expeditiously dismissed at the administrative level.
Discussions about the figures surrounding the EEOC's
tremendous backlog and limited enforcement actions73 have
remained a source of debate throughout the EEOC's existence. In
investigation appropriate to the particular charge, factoring in
resource considerations, and has assured that the [Charging Party]
has been provided a fair opportunity to present his or her case.
See Priority Charge Handling Task Force Litigation Task Force Report, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/task/pch-lit.html (Mar. 1998) (Sec. VI, under "Dismissals at
Intake"). Given the large number of cases that are dismissed, and general
difficulties regarding proof, it is likely that a large number of the "C" cases involve
unconscious discrimination, which requires a creative approach. Professor Ann
McGinley has provided one of the most recent and detailed explanations of how
unconscious discrimination may occur and why it should be a factor in addressing
discrimination in the workplace. See generally Ann C. McGinley, !Viva La
Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 415 (2000); see also Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and
Affirmative Action: A Critical Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind
and Race Conscious Decision Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 1003
(1997); Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 329-30 (1987) (describing how
discrimination laws fail to deal with the realities of unconscious racism); Jessie
Allen, Note, A Possible Remedy for Unthinking Discrimination, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 1299, 1299-1304 (1995) (asserting that the failure of civil rights laws is related
to the reluctance to expand the definition of discrimination to include an objective
standard that would address unconscious use of stereotypes). Professor Lamont
Stallworth has argued that "C" charges should be mediated rather than just
dismissed because they could involve unconscious discrimination. See Lamont E.
Stallworth et al., Discrimination in the Workplace: How Mediation Can Help, 56
DIsp. RESOL. J. 35, 37-43 (2001). Also, Professor Yelnosky has noted that the
existence of unconscious discrimination may make the EEOC process and the
litigation process unrealistic options for plaintiffs. Yelnosky, supra note 16, at 589-
92.
72. See St. Antoine, supra note 69, at 8.
73. In 1995, the EEOC backlog of charges had reached an all-time high of
over 100,000. Because of increasing responsibility to process charges for new anti-
discrimination statutes, and the failure of Congress to provide additional
resources, the EEOC backlog reached 111,345 by third quarter 1995; the EEOC
then implemented its priority charge handling procedure. At the end of its fiscal
year on September 30, 1999, the EEOC claimed that the priority charge handling
procedure had slashed its backlog down to 40,000-a twenty-three percent
decrease from the previous year. See Nancy Montwieler, EEOC Reaped Record
Benefits, Continued Culling Inventory Last Year, 20 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) C-i,
(Jan. 31, 2000). The EEOC also claimed that it had received an all-time high of
$307.3 million in benefits for victims of discrimination in 1999. See id. A large
portion of that amount was attributed to the EEOC's new voluntary mediation
program which caused victims of discrimination to receive up to $58 million. See
id.
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an independent analysis of the EEOC's mediation program, the
researchers describe how former EEOC Chairwoman Eleanor
Holmes Norton, starting in May 1977, developed a rapid charge
processing program; that program reduced the backlog while
allowing the EEOC's limited resources to focus on enforcement
objectives related to systemic and class-based discrimination.74 Ms.
Norton's background with New York's discrimination commission
led her to implement a fact-finding conference to get to the root of
the matter even before the EEOC began serious investigation."
These fact-finding conferences, along with the overall rapid charge
processing program, fostered quick settlements without any
recognition of fault and with significant reduction of the charge
backlog.6
When Clarence Thomas became the Chair of the EEOC in
1982, a General Accounting Office (GAO) report criticized the
rapid charge processing program as fostering a system where
culpability did not matter, cases with merit were being settled too
quickly and too cheaply, and cases without merit were being settled
for too much money.77 So Thomas disbanded the rapid charge
processing program and focused the EEOC's efforts on invest-
igating every individual charge and relying less on the high-profile
cases for enforcement. Under this policy, every individual charge
was investigated fully with either a finding of "reasonable cause" or
"no reasonable cause., 78 Again, the backlog of charges increased
and less enforcement activity occurred.
When Evan J. Kemp, Jr. replaced Thomas as EEOC Chair in
1990, the EEOC took on more responsibility with the Americans
With Disabilities Act. Kemp kept the same policy as Thomas of
doing full investigations for every charge, and the charge backlog
soared to nearly 100,000 in 1994 when Gilbert Cassellas became the
Chair.79
Similar to the regime of former Chairwoman Norton, former
Chairman Cassellas implemented a special charge procedure. This
74. See E. Patrick McDermott et al., An Evaluation of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Mediation Program, at http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate




78. Id.; see also Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal
Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482, 542-
44 (1987) (discussing the "rapid charge processing" program of Chairwoman
Norton, the critical GAO report and the response of Chairman Thomas).
79. See supra note 74.
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charge handling priority system, as discussed earlier, has focused on
reducing the backlog. When Ida Castro became the head of the
EEOC in 1998, she took the lead from Cassellas and implemented
additional programs to greatly assist in the reduction of the
backlog.8 Thus, the handling of charges and the resulting backlog
has become a key focus area for the EEOC at least since 1977. By
starting the agency off as a charge processing agency that
investigates charges without having the authority to enforce its
findings, Congress established an agency with no real strength.
Even when the agency was later provided with enforcement tools in
1972, it had already been stigmatized with the burden of
determining its success by the number and scope of charges it
processed rather than the number and scope of enforcement
initiatives it had completed. Thus, an agency charged with major
enforcement responsibility is constantly looking at its handling of
charges. Although the EEOC enforcement mechanisms may have
some teeth after the 1972 Act amendments allowing private
lawsuits for enforcement, Congress, the EEOC and all of its
stakeholders are paying too much attention to its charge processing
to put any real power behind its enforcement bite.
V. Outsourcing Charge Processing to Private and Mandatory
Mediation: A New Paradigm to Unleash the Tiger
A. The Development of the EEOC's Private Mediation Program
The EEOC has explained its mediation program as follows:
Mediation is a form of Alternative Dispute Resolution offered
by EEOC early in the process to facilitate resolution without
lengthy investigations or litigation. The decision to mediate is
completely voluntary for the charging party and the employer,
and the mediation process is strictly confidential at every stage.
During a mediation session, a neutral third party facilitator
helps the opposing sides to reach a negotiated resolution of
workplace disputes. Unlike an arbitrator or judge, the mediator
does not resolve the charge or impose a decision on the parties.
Instead, the mediator helps the parties to agree on a mutually




81. EEOC Launches Major Expansion of its Mediation Program, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/2-11-99.html (Feb. 11, 1999).
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The EEOC's mediation program started as a pilot program
conducted in four field offices in 1991.2 With the success of that
program, the EEOC established a taskforce to review further use of
the program s3 In 1994, that taskforce found that mediation was an
appropriate tool in resolving employment discrimination claims,
and it recommended the development of an expanded Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR) program.8
In 1995, the EEOC adopted a policy statement on ADR
establishing the requirement of certain core principles for
implementation of an expanded ADR program.85 In October 1996,
Congress re-enacted the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act,"
which authorized the expansion of the mediation program, while
district offices used pro bono services to add to their roster of
82. See History of EEOC Mediation Program, at http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate
/history.html (last modified Feb. 11, 1999).
83. See id.
84. See id. The EEOC based its decision on the recommendations of the task
force and the leadership from Commissioners who led the task force. See
Commission Votes to Incorporate Alternative Dispute Resolution into its Charge
Processing System; Defers Decisions on State and Local Agencies, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/press/4-28-95a.html (Apr. 28, 1995). At that time, EEOC
Commissioner Paul Steven Miller stated his belief that ADR would assist in charge
processing because it would "facilitate early resolution where agreement was
possible" and it "frees up our resources for use in identifying, investigating, and
litigating more complex cases of employment discrimination." Id. Likewise, then-
Commissioner R. Gaull Silberman stated that she believed that by making ADR a
part of the EEOC's "charge processing system," it would help "better serve our
constituents" and the EEOC's "law enforcement mission." Id.
85. See Committee Adopts Policy on Alternative Dispute Resolution as a First
Step in Implementing Agency ADR Program, at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/7-17-
95.html (July 17, 2001). That policy establishes three core principles for
implementation:
" Furthering the Commission's Mission: ADR programs implemented
by the Commission must further EEOC's dual mission of both
vigorously enforcing the anti-discrimination laws within the agency's
statutory mandate and resolving employment discrimination disputes.
" Fairness: An ADR program must be fair to all participants involved
by being voluntary, neutral, confidential, and enforceable.
Commission ADR processes will rely on a neutral third party to
facilitate resolution of disputes; maintain confidentiality at every step
of the process; and contain settlements that are enforceable by the
EEOC.
" Flexibility: An ADR program must be flexible enough to respond to
the wide-range of employment discrimination disputes that fall under
the laws enforced by EEOC, as well as to meet a wide range of
program needs.
Id.
86. Pub. L. No. 104-320, 110 Stat. 3870 (1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-84
(2001)).
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mediators.87  In fiscal year 1999, after receiving "$13 million
specifically allocated for the expansion of the EEOC's mediation
program," EEOC offices began using internal mediators employed
directly by the EEOC, external mediators hired on a contract basis,
and pro bono or volunteer mediators to conduct the mediation
sessions.88
The EEOC finally launched its voluntary mediation program
in February 1999 and it became functional at every district office
nationwide in April 1999.89 When the EEOC first proposed
expansion of its mediation program, EEOC Vice-Chairman Paul
Igasaki stated that the EEOC did not look at mediation as a
"backlog reduction tool."' However, after obtaining congressional
support for the program by the passage of the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1996,' the mediation program has
become a boon in the EEOC's efforts to reduce its backlog and has
received overwhelming support from all stakeholders.'
According to a report dated September 20, 2000 and entitled
An Evaluation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Mediation Program,93 participants in the mediation program
87. See supra note 82.
88. Id.
89. See generally Nancy Montwieler, EEOC's New Nationwide Mediation
Plan Offers Option of Informal Settlements, 29 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) C-1
(Feb. 12, 1999).
90. Kevin P. McGowan, Federal Agencies Seek Strategic Ways to Enforce
EEO Laws With Limited Funds, 151 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) D-11 (Aug. 6,
1996).
91. See supra note 86.
92. See EEOC List of "Major Accomplishments" Cites Mediation, Small
Business, 13 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-3 (Jan. 19, 2001) (describing how the
success of the mediation program allowed the EEOC to obtain $108.4 million
through mediation, how sixty-five percent of the cases sent to mediation were
successfully resolved, how the time to process charges was reduced, and how
the EEOC cut its charge inventory); see also Harkavy, supra note 16, at 155
(noting that the EEOC's pilot mediation program led not only to a major
reduction in charges due to a fifty-two percent settlement rate, but it also
caused a major reduction in the time that it took to resolve a charge, with
mediation taking an average time of sixty-seven days-compared with non-
mediated resolution taking an average time of 300 days). Harkavy has also
provided information suggesting that mediation decreases the number of
hearings in other workplace disputes involving administrative processes.
Harkavy, supra note 16, at 153 (concluding that mediation reduced the
number of worker's compensation administrative hearings in North Carolina
by forty percent).
93. This report can be found on the EEOC's website at
http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/report (Sept. 20. 2000). A full description of the
report's research methodology can be found by clicking on the link to Part V
from that site.
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expressed a high degree of satisfaction with the process and
expressed their willingness to participate in it again if they ever
become a party to a charge. 94 Specifically, the report also stated
that "nine out of ten participants.., indicated that they would be
willing to participate in EEOC's mediation program again...
regardless of the outcome of their mediation session."95 The main
problem that hindered further success of this program was the fact
that only thirty-one percent of employers accepted mediation when
a charge of discrimination was filed against them.96  EEOC
Chairwoman Castro hoped that the results of this independent
survey would send a message to employers that the EEOC's
mediation program is "fair, neutral, and makes good business sense
[because it] resolv[es] charge filings expeditiously, effectively, and
efficiently." '
Dr. E. Patrick McDermott was the primary researcher for the
independent study of the EEOC's mediation program. He noted
that "[i]n all my years of experience in the field of employment law,
I have never come across a program that enjoys such a high level of
participant satisfaction as the EEOC mediation program."98 The
EEOC's mediation program report analyzed mediation sessions
conducted between March and July 2000 and issued the following
findings:
" The participants expressed strong satisfaction with EEOC's
ability to communicate information regarding its mediation
program prior to the actual mediation and also after the
mediator's introduction at the session;
" The vast majority of participants agreed that their mediation
was scheduled promptly;
* An overwhelming majority of the participants believed they
had a full opportunity to present their views;
* The participants expressed high satisfaction with the role and
conduct of the mediators indicating that the mediators
understood and helped to clarify their needs, and also
assisted them in developing options for resolving the dispute;
94. See EEOC Mediation Program Scores High Marks in Major Survey of






" The high level of satisfaction for the mediators' performance
was true for both EEOC staff mediators and for contract
mediators;
" The overall level of satisfaction with the program remained
high regardless of such factors as the size of the employer,
basis or issue alleged in the underlying charge, or whether
the parties were represented during the session.99
Thus, it is essentially undisputed that the EEOC's mediation
program was a rousing success."
B. A Proposal to Make EEOC Mediation Mandatory and Private:
Getting Employers to Participate
With the only real negative aspect of the EEOC's current
mediation program being the fact that approximately two-thirds of
the employers have not participated,'' this Article proposes that
mediation should become a mandatory and private procedure. A
mandatory program will get more employer participation. A
private mandatory process eliminates employers' mistrust because
EEOC employees are not involved in the process.
Under the current EEOC mediation program, after the EEOC
conducts its initial intelligence gathering conversation to identify
the charge as either an "A", "B", or "C" charge, it then dismisses
99. Id. The detailed results from the Mediation Program Survey can be
found by linking to Part VI from this site: http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/report
(Sept. 20, 2000). See also EEOC List of Major Accomplishments Cites
Mediation, Small Business, 13 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-3 (Jan. 19, 2001).
100. See Michael R. Triplett, EEOC: Study Shows High Satisfaction Levels
With EEOC's Voluntary Mediation Program, 189 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-
6 (Sept. 28, 2000) (describing how nine out of ten participants would be willing
to participate in mediation again if they became involved in an EEOC charge,
and describing an overall high satisfaction rate among the participants).
101. See Susan J. McGolrick, EEOC: Agency Needs More Employers in
Mediation, Full Funding of Program, Chairwoman Says, 99 DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) A-8 (May 22, 2000) (discussing comments of Chairwoman Castro that
the mediation program needs more employer participation as only thirty-five
percent had participated in 1999). Castro noted that ninety-five percent of the
employers that participated appeared satisfied by the mediation program. Id.
Castro also noted that Congress level-funded the mediation program; in other
words, it provided the same amount for fiscal year 2001 as it did for fiscal year
2000. Id. This does not account for the cost-of-living increases that the
EEOC must provide to its employees. Id. The EEOC uses its mediation
program for "B" charges that require more investigation. Id. Castro's
comments and concerns about the 35 percent employer participation rate in
1999 proved noteworthy as the employer participation rate dropped to 31
percent in 2000. Compare id. with supra note 94.
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"C" charges, sends "B" charges to mediation if both parties agree
and continues to process "A" charges. 112  Professor Lamont
Stallworth has asserted that some "C" charges may involve subtle
or unconscious forms of discrimination that may be effectively
addressed through mediation." While that may be true, for
purposes of this Article's proposal, the EEOC would make that call
from its initial assessment of a charge and its determination of
whether it was an "A", "B", or "C" charge. Under the congress-
ional amendment proposed by this Article, the EEOC could send
"C" charges to mediation or it could dismiss them for no cause and
issue a right-to-sue letter. To provide flexibility, the EEOC will
have the authority to mandate that all "B" charges be sent to
mediation and it will be within the discretion of the EEOC as to
whether it sends certain "A" or "C" charges to mediation. To
ensure the sanctity and trust of the system, all charges that are
referred to mandatory mediation should be sent to private
mediation-not mediation with EEOC employees who may be
perceived as biased. Concerns about such bias may explain the
reasons why only 31 percent of employers have participated in the
mediation program."
102. See Nancy Montwieler, EEOC's New Nationwide Mediation Plan Offers
Option of Informal Settlements, 29 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) C-1 (Feb. 12, 1999).
103. See Stallworth et al., supra note 71.
104. See Montwieler, supra note 102, at C-1 (discussing comments from the
President of the Society for Human Resource Management expressing the view
that employers are concerned that by participating in the EEOC's mediation
program, they are "going to be forced to accept a settlement" and that the biggest
hurdle is to ensure that the program is "impartial" by using "outside mediators as
much as possible"); see also Hodges, supra note 16, at 488-89 (beginning a general
discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of using private outside mediators for
EEOC disability-related claims and how using private mediators might encourage
the use of mediation by employers who are likely to be "wary of revealing
informtion to the very agency responsible for investigating statutory violations"
and asserting that the "use of agency mediators might result in lower participation
rates"). As mentioned earlier, the employers' perception of the EEOC has
historically been one of an adversary relationship where, as long ago as the
administration of Chairwoman Norton, employers believed that the EEOC was
forcing financial settlements for charges that had no merit. See Silver, supra note
78, at 542, 563-65 (describing complaints about rapid charge processing program as
coercing EEOC settlements for charges having no merit). Although mediation
proceedings are generally confidential, employers with fears of bias by the EEOC
will likely believe that once EEOC employees are involved, any matters discussed
in mediation will be fodder for later use by the EEOC if a settlement is not
reached. See Symposium, Civil Rights Law in Transition: The Forty-Fifth
Anniversary of the New York City Commission on Human Rights Welcoming
Remarks, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1105, 1121-22"(2000) (describing the differences
between in-house EEOC mediators and private, outside volunteer mediators
regarding the additional level of structure necessary to maintain confidentiality
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In order to mandate private mediation, Congress must enact
legislation. This Article proposes the following language for such
legislation:
The EEOC is authorized to require that parties participate in
mediation. The EEOC may choose whatever charges it believes
will be best suited for resolution through mediation. Mediators
will be provided to the parties via a panel of private mediators
who will be trained and certified by the EEOC. Mediators will
be paid $800 per mediation. The payments will come from the
U.S. treasury and all funding for payments of the mediators will
be made separate and apart from any general funding decisions
about the EEOC's budget. Congress must provide money for
the mediation program as long as this legislation exists and it
must prioritize funds for this program on an annual basis
consistent with the number of charges submitted to mediation
on an annual basis. All parties must be notified of their rights
under the mediation program. Failure to appear at a mediation
session absent good cause may warrant dismissal of the charge
for the complainant and a default for the respondent. Parties
are expected to participate in mediation in good faith but they
are not expected to reach an agreement. Any mechanisms that
engender force or compulsion to settle without voluntary and
informed consent are expressly prohibited. The EEOC must
approve all settlements reached through mediation before they
can become final. All information submitted in mediation is
considered confidential and may not be used in any legal
proceedings. Mediators may not give testimony in any
proceedings regarding information learned in mediation and
may not perform any task in violation of the Uniform Mediation
Act.
Congress is already considering legislation that would require
private mediation for disputes involving federal contractors under
the National Employment Dispute Resolution Act (NEDRA)' 5
when mediators are EEOC employees). There may be no absolute guarantee that
communications made during mediation proceedings remain privileged and
confidential despite any guarantees by statute or in writing. See Lynn Rambo,
Impeaching Lying Parties With Their Statements During Negotiation: Demysticizing
the Public Policy Rationale Behind Evidence Rule 408 and the Mediation-Privilege
Statutes, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1037, 1093-94 (2000) (arguing that statements
constituting prior inconsistent statements, when made during mediation
proceedings, should be allowed as proper impeachment at trial despite guarantees
of confidentiality and the existence of mediation privilege laws).
105. H.R. 4593, 106th Cong. (2000). A full copy of the text of NEDRA may be
found in the Appendix at the end of this Article. NEDRA requires the EEOC to
provide mediation for federal employees. Id. § 3. Also, section 3 of NEDRA
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and may also review legislation being drafted to provide uniform
mediation standards.1" A simple amendment to that proposed
legislation would add the provisions above requiring separate
funding for private mediation and mandating its use for all EEOC
charges as chosen by the EEOC. By making it mandatory at the
discretion of the EEOC, all parties would have a good faith
obligation to meet and attempt mediation for charges that the
EEOC selected. Any resolution of a charge through mediation
would still have to be voluntary and with informed consent. 7
This process would satisfy all the stakeholders. If the EEOC's
mediation program becomes private and mandatory, then most of
the EEOC's ongoing concerns about charge processing would be
handled through the private mediation process. In some respects
this may model the rapid charge processing system that former
Chairwoman Norton championed during her reign." However,
would amend Title VII by requiring those federal contractors having contracts of
$200,000 or more and 200 or more employees to establish internal dispute
resolution programs or systems that would, among other things, provide workplace
disputants with the opportunity to resolve discrimination and other workplace
disputes internally before a charge is filed with the EEOC. Id. The federal
contractors are responsible for payment of the mediator's fees and expenses. Id.
The key component of NEDRA that is important to the author of this Article is
that it mandates or directs participation in mediation. NEDRA is one-sided in
that regard; a federal contractor-employer must participate, even though an
employee does not have to participate unless he or she agrees to do so. Although
NEDRA requires mediation for all charges, this Article proposes that mediation
be mandatory for all charges that the EEOC chooses to send to mediation. A full
explanation of the purposes and expectations of NEDRA is beyond the scope of
this Article. The authors of NEDRA have provided an excellent analysis of
NEDRA and an explanation of why it should be adopted. See Stallworth et al.,
supra note 71.
106. On August 16, 2001, members of the American Bar Association's Section
on Dispute Resolution and the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform Laws completed work on the Uniform Mediation Act. I have included
language at the end of my proposal to provide consistency with that law. The
Uniform Mediation Act can be found at the following Internet site:
http://www.pon.harvard.edu/guests/uma (last modified Oct. 5, 2001).
107. See generally Nolan-Haley, supra note 16 (expressing concerns about the
lack of informed consent in mediation). The EEOC would have final approval of
any settlement to ensure consent is voluntary and informed. Because of this
proposed discretion, the EEOC could also decide that some "B" cases involving
repeat offenders may have to be treated as "A" cases requiring full investigation
and conciliation. In addition, it is possible that certain "A" cases could be well-
suited for mediation.
108. See Silver, supra note 78, at 542, 563-65 (describing how the Office of Civil
Rights in the Department of Education undertook a mediation program with the
hope that it would reduce its backlog of complaints, just as the "rapid charge
processing" program worked for the EEOC in reducing its backlog during the
administration of Chairwoman Eleanor Holmes Norton).
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instead of EEOC employees pushing settlements on parties and
getting charges dismissed solely for backlog reasons, mediation is
designed to have an outside party assist the parties in crafting a
mutual resolution. Even if mediation is unsuccessful, the process is
worthwhile. If the parties fail to reach a settlement through
mediation, the EEOC could still decide to process the charge and
take the case or it could just dismiss it without any further
investigation.
Although the courts may expect the EEOC to prevent
frivolous suits, Congress designed Title VII to be a private
individual enforcement statute. It is the courts, not the EEOC, that
must ferret out meaningless claims should they reach the courts. By
requiring mandatory and private mediation, a significant portion of
the charge processing function and its backlog is outsourced or
transferred out of the hands of the EEOC and into the private
mediation process.1" This allows the EEOC to focus its limited
resources and funding on enforcement initiatives tackling systemic
and class-based problems that may have a more meaningful effect
over time.
C. Addressing Process Dangers of Mandatory Mediation
A number of commentators have analyzed mandatory
mediation outside of the employment dispute context.11° Professor
109. Even the EEOC has recognized that its mediation program helps reduce
its charge backlog. See EEOC List of "Major Accomplishments" Cites Mediation,
Small Business, 13 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-3 (Jan. 19, 2001) (describing how
sixty-five percent of the cases sent to mediation were successfully resolved).
110. See generally John P. McCrory, Mandated Mediation of Civil Cases in State
Courts: A Litigant's Perspective on Program Model Choices, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 813 (1999) (discussing the overall advantages of various mandatory
mediation court programs for general civil disputes not including small claims or
domestic relations cases); Susan C. Kuhn, Comment, Mandatory Mediation:
California Civil Code Section 4607, 33 EMORY L.J. 733 (1984) (discussing
mandatory mediation statute for child custody disputes in California); John G.
Mebane, III, Comment, An End to Settlement on the Courthouse Steps? Mediated
Settlement Conferences in North Carolina Superior Courts, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1857
(1993) (discussing mandatory mediation statute for civil actions in North
Carolina); Kelly Rowe, Comment, The Limits of the Neighborhood Justice Center:
Why Domestic Violence Cases Should Not Be Mediated, 34 EMORY L.J. 855 (1985)
(criticizing the use of court-ordered mediation for domestic violence cases); David
S. Winston, Note, Participation Standards in Mandatory Mediation Statutes: "You
Can Lead a Horse to Water....", 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 187 (1996)
(proposing that legislatures move past the ambiguous "good faith" or "meaningful
participation" standards in mandatory mediation and move to a stronger objective
test for assessing participation). See also Gary Smith, Unwilling Actors: Why
Voluntary Mediation Works, Why Mandatory Mediation Might Not, 36 OSGOODE
[Vol. 105:3
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Michael Yelnosky has recently recognized that power imbalances
can occur in employment disputes and great care should be taken
when shifting disputes into private resolution forums."' These
questions about imbalance of power have fostered the general
critique of mediation and informal dispute resolution as a
mechanism to protect the "haves""' 2 and disadvantage the "have-
nots '1 3 in the dispute. Specific disadvantaged segments of society
that may be harmed under this theory include people of color,1
HALL L.J. 847 (1998) (criticizing mandatory mediation in Canada).
111. See Yelnosky, supra note 16, at 606-08.
112. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974).
Professor Menkel-Meadow has recently highlighted this issue as it relates to the
use of mediation and other forms of ADR. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players
in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 19 (1999).
113. There are some critics of mediation and other forms of ADR who believe
that these processes are part of a general plan to prevent certain rights from being
vindicated in public forums where greater concerns may be addressed. See, e.g.,
Owen M. Fiss, Commentary, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984)
(analyzing adjudication in terms of public values that are threatened by settlement
and ADR processes); Isabelle R. Gunning, Diversity Issues In Mediation:
Controlling Negative Cultural Myths, 1995 J. DisP. RESOL. 55, 61-62 (discussing
"rights" theories); Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public
Interest: The Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 255, 302-03 (1987)
(asserting that certain public interests must be protected when implementing
private ADR programs); Ralph Nader, The Corporate Drive to Restrict Their
Victims' Rights, 22 GONZ. L. REV. 15, 20-21 & n.211 (1986) (describing the value of
litigation options, including the jury system, as a deterrent to future wrongdoing,
and as a public communication vehicle to expose a wrongdoer). But see Note,
Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelines for Ensuring Fair and
Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1095, 1104 (1990) (proposing the
adoption of mandatory mediation programs). Some commentators are known for
their views challenging a rush to use ADR versus the courts. See generally Laura
Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in
the Movement to Reform Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 1 (1993);
Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 211 (1995). A critical review of how
issues of culture affect any proposed dispute resolution system should also be
explored. See generally PAT K. CHEW, CONFLICT AND CULTURE READER (2001)
(suggesting that any understanding of conflict resolution must consider cultural
aspects); see also Cynthia A. Savage, Culture and Mediation: A Red Herring, 5 AM.
U. J. GENDER & LAW 269 (1996) (describing need for broad-based recognition of
cultural differences in mediation, beyond typical areas of race and gender, to assist
effective mediation across those cultures).
114. See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1360-
61, 1375-99 (arguing that the adversarial process in litigation promotes efforts to
fight prejudice, and that by allowing informal mechanisms, people of color
eventually feel compelled to accede to the stronger parties whose prejudiced
beliefs cloud their positions).
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women, the poor, or a combination of these groups. '17  Some
empirical analysis does suggest that these power imbalance
concerns should not be neglected.'18 Any program that supplements
115. See, e.g., Grillo, supra note 20, at 1549 (arguing that mediation "can be
destructive to many women" because of the imbalance of power); see generally
Carol J. King, Burdening Access to Justice: The Cost of Divorce Mediation on the
Cheap, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 375 (1999) (stating concerns that mediation limits
access to the court system for poor women in divorce proceedings).
116. See generally Larry R. Spain, Alternative Dispute Resolution for the Poor:
Is It an Alternative?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 269 (1994) (describing issues with respect to
use of ADR for the poor).
117. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don't Add Up to Rights: The
Importance of Preserving Due Process in Light of Recent Welfare Reform
Measures, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1111, 1114-21 (1996) (asserting that low-income
women, particularly those of color, do not fair well in informal processes); see also
Stephen Meili and Tamara Packard, Alternative Dispute Resolution in a New
Health Care System; Will It Work for Everyone?, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL.
23, 30-35 (1994) (describing problems with ADR for women, minorities and the
poor). But see Beryl Blaustone, The Conflicts of Diversity, Justice, and Peace in the
Theories of Dispute Resolution, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 253, 261 n.17 (1994) (pointing
out that the argument of Delgado is not supported empirically); Gunning, supra
note 113, at 86-93 (noting that concerns about the use of mediation for powerless
and disadvantaged members of society can be rectified by assuring that the
mediator is trained regarding equality and intervenes to protect the disadvantaged
party); Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants' Ethnicity and
Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 767, 770 (1996) (stating that before their efforts, there were no
empirical studies showing how a disputant's ethnicity or gender compares in court
cases versus mediation cases); Joshua D. Rosenberg, In Defense of Mediation, 33
ARIz. L. REV. 467, 467-68 (1991) (asserting that Professor Grillo's account of
mediation only refers to those few bad cases and ignores good mediation
experiences). Nevertheless, both Blaustone and LaFree & Rack recognize that the
existence of bias and bargaining power can play a factor in mediation, and both
argue that a mediator must take those factors into account. Blaustone, supra, at
261 n.17; LaFree & Rack, supra, at 788-94.
118. See LaFree & Rack, supra note 117, at 788-94 (describing findings
concluding that female and male claimants of color received less in mediation than
similarly situated white claimants in litigation based upon the actual percentages of
the amounts obtained). The results of this study did not show a process difference
when results for women in mediation versus adjudication are compared. Id. at
791-93; see also Blaustone, supra note 117, at 261 n.17 (describing a study
conducted by Professor Michele Hermann that found claimants of color received
less money from mediation than in the courts, even though they were more
satisfied with the mediation process, and also finding that women did not
experience any monetary difference between mediation and the courts but women
were much less satisfied with mediation versus the courts). In another recent
analysis of this empirical data, process differences for parties of different races or
parties with little power are highlighted as a major concern. See generally
Christine Rack, Negotiated Justice: Gender & Ethnic Minority Bargaining Patterns
in the Metro Court Study, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 211 (1999) (describing
data from prior study and analyzing the negative effects in bargaining differences
for ethnic minorities, women, and those with limited bargaining power in
mediation conducted on interest-based facilitative principles).
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the duties of the EEOC should be sensitive to ensure that the
parties the EEOC is intended to protect are not harmed by an
imbalance of power.'19 However, this form of mandatory media-
tion, unlike mandatory arbitration,'20 is limited by the fact that any
agreements reached pursuant to mediation must be voluntary121
Empirical study has also shown that the use of mandatory
mediation substantially increases the overall participation in a
mediation program. Because lack of participation was the only
drawback in an exceptionally well received EEOC mediation
program, the risks of mandatory participation are outweighed by
the purported benefits.
Also, despite concerns about mandatory participation in
mediation, empirical study has shown that parties to a mandatory
mediation are just as satisfied and reach settlement at the same rate
as parties to a voluntary mediation proceeding. While acknow
ledging concerns about the use of mandatory mediation, the Society
for Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) developed its own
provisions to handle concerns about unfairness in mandatory
119. See Yelnosky supra note 16, at 607-08 (recognizing that any "vision of Title
VII enforcement incorporating widespread use of mediation should try to account
for the power imbalance problem").
120. Unlike mediation, arbitration is usually binding on the parties. By
mandating it, that system forces the parties to accept the result, rather than forcing
only participation in the process. See generally Green, supra note 16 (describing
the strengths and weaknesses of mandatory arbitration involving large or small
employers and their individual employees); Ronald Turner, Employment
Discrimination, Labor and Employment Arbitration and the Case Against Union
Waiver of the Individual Worker's Statutory Right to a Judicial Forum, 49 EMORY
L.J. 135 (2000) (describing mandatory arbitration concerns with respect to
situations involving a business and employees represented by a union); see also
Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitration and the EEOC, 27 PEPP.
L. REV. 1, 19-26 (1999) (describing the EEOC's policy against mandatory
arbitration).
121. See Winston, supra note 110, at 188-89 (acknowledging that mandatory
mediation may be an "oxymoron" because the process is still voluntary with
respect to the decision to accept or decline a settlement proposal developed in
mediation).
122. See Rogers & McEwen, supra note 16, at 848.
123. Id. at 850; see also Wissler, supra note 20, at 566 (finding from empirical
analysis of small claims and common pleas court cases that mandatory versus
voluntary mediation has little difference in terms of case outcome and participant
evaluation). The empirical research of Roselle Wissler also demonstrates that
there is little difference in outcome between mandatory versus voluntary
mediation based upon the race or sex of the litigants. Wissler, supra note 20, at
566, 576-77. Although there are some differences about this empirical study that
may not translate to employment discrimination cases where race or sex is directly
at issue, it is still another helpful source. See id. at 603 (acknowledging that the
study may not readily apply to other mandatory mediation disputes or
procedures).
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mediation proceedings.' Unless the process is mandatory, the
reality is that only a small percentage of charges will be mediated.'
Thus, increasing participation in the EEOC's mediation program by
making it mandatory will benefit all the stakeholders.
126
Professor Isabelle R. Gunning has analyzed the various forms
of bias and prejudice affecting the mediation processes.2 7 One of
the concerns about the imbalance of power is that the employer will
be represented by counsel when the weaker party, the employee,
will not have legal representation. However, in mediation, the
use of lawyers may not necessarily add value to the process.29  As
124. See Mandated Participation and Settlement Coercion: Dispute Resolution as
It Relates to the Courts, 46 ARB. J. 38-44 (1991) (this publication is available from
the Association for Conflict Resolution, SPIDR's successor organization at
http://www.acresolution.org); see also McCrory, supra note 110, at 824, 833
(describing SPIDR standards). The SPIDR standards focus on making sure that
the mediators determine which practice or technique is appropriate for the
individual parties, including the "nature of the dispute, the type of process
available or used, the structure of the dispute resolution services-e.g. formal or
informal, time-pressed or leisurely, etc.-and the social and cultural setting."
McCrory, supra note 110, at 837 n.93 (citation omitted).
125. See McCrory, supra note 110, at 815 n.11 (discussing the Ohio and Georgia
mandatory mediation court programs and recognizing that those programs had to
be mandatory because only a small percentage would volunteer to mediate).
126. See Gourlay & Soderquist, supra note 16, at 264-66 (describing benefits of
mediation for employers and employees).
127. See Gunning, supra note 113, at 65-68. However, Professor Gunning also
demonstrates quite persuasively that assumptions about the balance of power in
mediation may not be problematic at all, or they can be overcome through
exacting detail, analysis, and intervention by a skilled and well-trained mediator.
See id. at 86-93. Professor Gunning also suggests that another way to address
issues of race, sex, and sexual orientation may be to match those parties with
mediators who have similar backgrounds. See id. at 88-90; see also Fred D. Butler,
When Should Race, Culture, or Gender be a Factor When Considering a Mediator?,
26 S.F. ATr'y 33, 33-34 (2000) (suggesting that mediators should be selected based
upon race, gender, and an understanding of those concepts to better address the
interests of the parties involved in the dispute); McCrory, supra note 110, at 840-42
(discussing the need for available mediators of diverse races, sexes, and ethnic
backgrounds).
128. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 16, at 777-78 (describing the assumption that
participants understand what they are doing when they agree to settle a dispute
through mediation, but in reality the parties do not truly understand what is
occurring or what they have consented to in mediation, especially when not
represented by counsel).
129. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Transformation of Disputes By Lawyers:
What the Dispute Paradigm Does Not Tell Us, 1985 J. DisP. RESOL. 25, 31
(explaining that, in the process of transforming a grievant's story to make it
amenable to conventional management procedures, a lawyer may narrow the
nature of the dispute); see also Reginald Alleyne, Delawyerizing Labor
Arbitration, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 53 (1989) (complaining about the effect of more
lawyers being involved in labor arbitration as having a negative effect on that form
of alternative dispute resolution); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43
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Professor Gunning has also eloquently expressed, the concerns of
the powerless and disadvantaged members of society can be
addressed in mediation by making sure that the mediator has the
skills and abilities to adequately assess those situations and respond
accordingly.
1 30
To address specific concerns about process dangers, the role of
the mediator becomes paramount. Mediators may play various
roles and take various approaches depending upon the circum-
stances.1 31 In an "evaluative" mediation approach, the mediator
focuses on the parties' legal dispute by analyzing the constraints of
the law involved and assessing the relative strengths of each side's
legal position to assist the parties in reaching a resolution.3
Another approach'33 consists of "facilitative" mediation in which
the mediator addresses any problem that the parties raise and
focuses on their individual interests without assessing any legal
positions of the parties.'" Some commentators have challenged
whether mediators should use evaluative mediation because it tends
to destroy the neutrality of the mediator if he or she must inform
one side about the legal aspects of the dispute.' The EEOC
OHIO ST. L.J. 29, 45 (1982) ("Lawyers are trained to put people and events into
categories that are legally meaningful, to think in terms of rights and duties
established by rules, [and] to focus on acts more than persons."); Nolan-Haley,
supra note 16, at 831 n.264 (discussing mixed findings regarding the benefit of
lawyers in mediation).
130. See Gunning, supra note 113, at 86-93; see also Harkavy, supra note 16, at
167-68 (arguing that mediators should also be skilled in the employment
discrimination field); McCrory, supra note 110, at 830 n.65 (discussing the
advantage of mediators learning different styles of mediation and selecting from a
"spectrum of techniques" that a mediator might use depending upon the individual
situation).
131. See generally Dwight Golann, Variations in Mediation: How-and Why-
Legal Mediators Change Styles in the Course of a Case, 2000 J. DiSp. RESOL. 41
(arguing that mediators in legal disputes often change styles many times
throughout the process and it is necessary to do so when mediating legal disputes);
see also Riskin, supra note 16, at 35-36, 40-41 (describing various mediation styles).
132. See Yelnosky, supra note 16, at 601.
133. There are also other forms of mediation approaches, styles, and models
including "transformative," "shuttle diplomacy," and "dealmaking." Nolan-Haley,
supra note 16, at 814 n.189 (mentioning various mediation models and citing
articles describing their application).
134. See Yelnosky, supra note 16, at 601; see also Riskin, supra note 16, at 27.
135. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Bush, A Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy
Implications, 1994 J. DisP. RESOL. 1, 28-31 (asserting that it is inappropriate for a
mediator to use the evaluative approach because it detracts from the neutrality of
the mediator); Gunning, supra note 113, at 81-83 (describing Bush's arguments
that evaluative mediation has a harmful effect on the mediator's neutrality). But
see Harkavy, supra note 16, at 167-68 (criticizing a purely facilitative mediation
approach for mediating employment discrimination cases). Also, concerns about
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mediation program tends to suggest a facilitative approach.'36
However, mediators of employment discrimination disputes need to
be trained to use evaluative approaches in those instances where it
is clear that an imbalance of power may be an issue.'37 Probably the
most appropriate approach is to ensure that the results from
mediation are voluntary and not an effort by the mediator to
"cajole or bamboozle parties into consent.'5038
Accordingly, while the academics debate the merits of
evaluative versus facilitative approaches to mediation,9  the
mediator should focus on an assessment of which approach is more
the unlicenced practice of law and other ethical issues beyond the scope of this
Article may be raised during an "evaluative" mediation proceeding. See Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and Professionalism in Non-Adversarial Lawyering, 27
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 153,156-57 (1999).
136. See Yelnosky, supra note 16, at 601-02 (describing the initial pilot program
of the EEOC which referred to an "interest-based" mediation to resolve EEOC
disputes, and referring to various mediation settlements under that program
including creative resolutions outside available legal remedies, where employers
agreed to alter work rules or make disciplinary changes).
137. See Gunning, supra note 113, at 80-86 (arguing that imbalances of power in
mediation can be alleviated by training mediators to use evaluative mediation and
to intervene to protect the interests of those parties).
138. Nolan-Haley, supra note 16, at 778; see also Robert A. Baruch Bush, What
Do We Need a Mediator For? "Value-Added" for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON
DIsP. RESOL. 1, 8, 36 (1996) (discussing failed mediation negotiations that occur
when settlement is reached at undue cost or on sub-optimal terms).
139. See, e.g., James J. Alfini, Evaluative Versus Facilitative Mediation: A
Discussion, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 919 (1997); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency
and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and
Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253 (1989); John Feerick et al.,
Standards of Professional Conduct in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1995 J. DisP.
RESOL. 95, 106-08;. Andree G. Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation for
Battered Women, 15 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 272, 273-74 (1992); Samuel J. Imperati,
Mediator Practice Models: The Intersection of Ethics and Stylistic Practices in
Mediation, 33 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 703, 713 (1997); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela
P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV.
71 (1998); John Lande, How Will Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform
Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839, 856-79 (1997); Lela P. Love, The Top
Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937
(1997); Robert B. Moberly, Mediator Gag Rules: Is It Ethical for Mediators to
Evaluate or Advise?, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 669 (1997); Barbara A. Phillips, Mediation:
Did We Get It Wrong?, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 649, 701 (1997); Leonard L.
Riskin, Mediation Quandaries, 24 FLA ST. U. L. REV. 1007 (1997); James H. Stark,
The Ethics of Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative
Proposals, from an Evaluative Lawyer-Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 795
(1997); Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative Mediator Orientations:
Piercing the "Grid" Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985 (1997); Ellen A. Waldman,
The Evaluative-Facilitative Debate in Mediation: Applying the Lens of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 82 MARO. L. REV. 155 (1998); Donald T. Weckstein, In Praise of
Party Empowerment-and of Mediator Activism, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 501
(1997).
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appropriate in each mediation setting." Professor Nolan-Haley has
expressed serious doubts about whether mandatory mediation can
ever involve the level of informed consent that she believes is
necessary. 4' However, even she acknowledges that it might work if
there is a heightened level of protection involved in the process."'
Given the benefits of making EEOC mediation mandatory, any
concerns about neutrality must give way to protecting the interests
of all the parties regarding their informed and voluntary resolution
of the dispute through mediation.'
Furthermore, analysis of the EEOC's mediation program
demonstrates that the participants were clearly informed about
their rights and that they knew what could occur even in instances
where the parties did not actually reach an agreement." Also,
because the EEOC's current mediation program shows that not all
cases settle, even when participation is voluntary, it may support
the position that the EEOC's mediation program fosters only
voluntary settlements.'45  The mediators must determine that
process dangers or any other reasons have not led to a settlement
that is truly involuntary or one that is based upon uninformed
consent."6 The EEOC still plays a role. If the EEOC believes a
140. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False Dichotomies: The
Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 949 (1997) (contending that it is not whether facilitative is a better
approach than evaluative or vice versa but which approach is more appropriate
under the circumstances or even if a mixture of the approaches may be appropriate
depending on the needs of the disputants in that situation); Nolan-Haley, supra
note 16, at 824, 827 (arguing same and suggesting the use of a sliding scale for
disclosure in terms of the context of the specific dispute).
141. Nolan-Haley, supra note 16, at 829.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See E. Patrick McDermott et al., An Evaluation of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission Mediation Program, at http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate
/report (Sept. 20, 2000) (click on link to Part IV.C).
145. Yelnosky, supra note 16, at 602 (raising the same argument).
146. See McCrory, supra note 110, at 831 (suggesting a flexible approach to
handling disputes in mandatory mediation, and that the application of styles to be
used will be determined by the needs of the participants). SPIDR suggested that
mandatory mediation may be acceptable as long as the mediation process takes
specific aims to ensure that power and education differences do not force a
settlement that is not the intent of the parties. See id. at 833. SPIDR referred to
this as ensuring that the participants are "quality" participants who understand the
ramifications of the mandatory mediation process. See id. Other factors in the
quality aspects of the mediation program involve the skill and diversity of the
mediators. See id. at 836 (listing several necessary items for a quality mediation
panel, including diversity of gender, race, ethnicity, mediation style, subject matter
familiarity, size, and experience).
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settlement obtained through mediation was coerced, it can proceed
to process the charge as usual.
Another concern about an EEOC mandatory mediation
program is that it may cause a perverse disincentive for employers
to not create their own internal programs if they know that the
EEOC will cause mediation to occur anyway, especially if there is
no charge for the mediator's fee.147 But, if the NEDRA is adopted,
certain employers (federal contractors with $200,000 contracts and
200 employees) will have a duty to establish a private mediation
program anyway. Furthermore, employers are not prohibited from
having their own internal mediation policies and programs despite
this Article's proposal.
An internal program could provide separate benefits to an
employer. Unlike the EEOC mediation program proposed herein,
the employers in an internal program could choose their own
mediator rather than have the mediator assigned to them under the
EEOC's program. Finally, by allowing the EEOC discretion to
choose which charges are sent to mandatory mediation, the EEOC
can prevent specific offenders from repeatedly using the
government-sponsored mediation rather than adopting their own
internal mediation programs.
VI. Making Mediation Private to Remove the Political
Manipulation of the EEOC's Funding for the Program:
Dealing With Not So Subtle Efforts to Muzzle the Tiger
A. Congressional Meddling with the EEOC's Programs
Efforts by Congress to use its power in the appointment and
funding process to stymie the EEOC are well known.'4 In 1998,
147. However, studies have shown that even charging a modest fee for
voluntary mediation may make the program "inaccessible to low income"
complainants. See Thomas Kochan et al., An Evaluation of the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination Alternative Dispute Resolution Program, 5
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 233, 245, 277 (2000) (describing wealth bias problems
associated with Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination mediation
program which required a payment of a fee and legal representation). SPIDR
agreed that the wealth of the participants should not matter in an agency-run
program. See Peter S. Adler et al., Guidelines for Voluntary Mediation Programs
Instituted by Agencies Charged with Enforcing Workplace Rights, at
http://acresolution.org (Apr. 21, 1998) (click on "Learning Center," then on
"Guidelines," then on article's title).
148. These efforts are not limited to attempts to stifle the EEOC. Pennsylvania
Republican Congressman William F. Goodling, who sat on House Education and
Workplace Committee for twenty-six years and functioned as its chair from 1994
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Congress even stalled the appointment of EEOC Commissioners,
threatening to bring the EEOC to a standstill as it became danger-
ously close to not having enough Commissioners for a quorum. '
Many observers believed that the failure to confirm Commissioners
was "linked ... to the GOP's perception that the Commission is
overly sympathetic to plaintiffs" and that belief was recently
confirmed by an attorney representing corporations when he
acknowledged that due to "political indifference" and the fact that
the "EEOC has been so underfunded and so understaffed for such
a long time that you can't fault them for the [backlog] situation
anymore."50
A recent study presented to the United Nations applauds the
efforts of the EEOC in reducing its backlog, hiring new employees
and improving technology while also pointing to the fact that
"[i]nadequate enforcement of existing anti-discrimination laws due
to underfunding of federal and state civil rights agencies is among a
host of reasons cited for the 'subtle' forms of discrimination against
minority individuals and groups that exist in American society."''
Assistant Attorney General Bill Lann Lee acknowledged that
until recently retiring, expressed the view that Congress should restrain agencies
from developing policies and regulations that prevent employers from competing
in the twenty-first century because they have a chilling effect on the growth of the
economy. See In Parting, Goodling Urges Regulatory Caution, Amending
Outdated Labor Laws, 248 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-1 (Dec. 27, 2000). Goodling
specifically mentioned Republican attempts to prevent the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance Programs (OFCCP) from issuing regulations. Id.; see also Ergonomics
Restriction in Labor-HHS Bill Could Be Off the Table Hasten Aide Says, 238 Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-11 (Dec. 11, 2000) (discussing Republican attempts to prevent
OSHA from issuing ergonomics regulations by tying the funding of the
Department of Labor to a prohibition, thus preventing the issuance of the
ergonomics final rule, and attempts by Republican majority whip Tom Delay to
limit funding for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and
Education to last year's levels). The NLRB is also a target of congressional
meddling through the use of funding decisions. See, e.g., NLRB: Board Officials
Grilled On Budget At Senate Appropriations Hearing, 25 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
D-3 (Feb. 7, 1996) (discussing efforts to limit appropriations to the NLRB and
Union official complaints that the Senate's budget cuts for the NLRB were merely
aimed at retaliation for having tried to accomplish its enforcement mission through
its increased use of injunctions and the need to appease business that the NLRB
will be unable to continue that practice).
149. Darryl Van Duch, Paralysis for EEOC Feared, NAT'L L.J. at Al (Aug. 24,
1998).
150. Id.
151. See Race Discrimination: Report to U.N. Panel Lauds Recent Changes at
EEOC for Improved Attacks on Race Bias, 185 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-8 (Sept.
22, 2000). A full copy of the report may be found at the U.S. State Department
website: http://www.state.gov (visited Feb. 15, 2001).
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budget increases in 1999 had led to major improvements at the
EEOC. In 1999, instead of its customary "flatlined" budgets, the
Clinton administration and Congress agreed to improve the funding
for the EEOC and the Civil Rights Division of the Department of
Justice.1
52
As a prelude to how pernicious congressional meddling in the
affairs of the EEOC has become and despite the overwhelming
success of the EEOC's mediation program, congressional budget
cuts forced the EEOC to terminate the use of private mediators in
2000.' Thus, similar to the charge processing backlog, the EEOC
has become encumbered with delays in scheduling mediation
sessions. 5' Because of the $13 million that the EEOC received in
1999 to get the program going, the EEOC was able to assemble a
cadre of about 100 in-house mediators at its twenty-four District
offices, along with a significant pool of outside mediators who were
hired on a contract basis. However, Congress did not approve
funding for mandatory cost-of-living increases for 2000. The EEOC
was forced to absorb costs of approximately $8 million and the
contract mediators were the first to be let go as a result of the lack
of funding.156 Although Chairwoman Castro believes that the
EEOC mediation program is one of the "shining stars" in the
EEOC's list of accomplishments, she has asked "contract
mediators, usually paid $800 per mediation, to offer some of their
services on a pro bono basis. '1'  Thus, continued congressional
152. Id.
153. Julie Harders, Too Good to Last? Budget Cuts Force the EEOC to
Terminate Contract Mediators From its New, Highly Touted Program, A.B.A. J. 30
(Apr. 2000); see also Fawn Johnson, EEOC: Castro Says FY 2000 Budget Means
Loss of Mediation Program's External Contractors, 38 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-
10 (Feb. 25, 2000) (discussing that $800 per mediation by private mediators would
not be funded in 2000 as the EEOC reached out to organizations to provide pro
bono mediation services); Fawn Johnson, EEOC: House Subcommittee Approves
Increase of $10 Million in EEOC's FY2001 Budget, Ill Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-
10 (Jun. 8, 200) (noting comments of Chairwoman Castro that budget approved by
Congress was only an increase of $10 million instead of the requested $29 million,
that this shortfall would place the EEOC at "critical mass" given that cost of living
increases, by themselves, would increase the EEOC's budget by $11 million, which
would require the EEOC to abandon staffing for its mediation program).
154. Harders, supra note 153, at 30.
155. Id.
156. Id. GOP members of Congress may argue that the Democratic-led EEOC
could have made cuts in other parts of their programs rather than cutting the
private mediation program. However, the result of not providing enough funding
for the EEOC to make annual cost of living increases for its employees led to the
private mediation program being virtually disbanded.
157. Id.; see EEOC's Mediation Program Going Strong Despite Budget
Shortfall, Coordinators Say, 59 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) B-1 (Mar. 27, 2000) (noting
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meddling in the affairs of the EEOC has resulted in a hindrance to
the one program that both sides of the aisle and all the stakeholders
believe is worthwhile, the mediation program.
As with most analysis of government enforcement agencies,
the more "compelling" reasons for lax enforcement probably have
to do with "money and politics" and the "shifting sands of political
will." '158 A Republican-led Congress presents a number of oppor-
tunities to have the EEOC's mediation and enforcement efforts
stopped by budget cutting, especially under its currently
Democratic-led Commissioners. If Congress truly supports
mediation, it should provide for an ongoing use of mediation to
resolve employment discrimination disputes under the jurisdiction
of the EEOC regardless of the political parties of the EEOC
Commissioners or those in control of Congress.
In order to prevent private mandatory mediation from being
subjected to cyclical administrative budget fights, the funding for
this program should be separate from the EEOC's general funding.
Near the end of 1998, Congress increased the budget of the EEOC
by $37 million dollars for fiscal year 1999.159 This increase was
partially intended to establish an ongoing program to mediate
EEOC charges. Because $9 million of the 1999 budget was used to
get the private mediation program going and an $8 million dollar
shortfall in budget year 2000 caused its abandonment, the author
recommends that Congress allocate $10 million dollars annually to
this program for the next five years and keep its funding separate
from any decisions about the EEOC's general funding. Both sides
of the aisle are supportive of using mediation to resolve Title VII
disputes and should put the money where it should be, in the
mediation program."6  Government funding of this private
the problem in funding that led to dismissal of private mediators who constituted
about fifty percent of the initial mediation program and how pro bono mediators
were keeping the program afloat). It is unreasonable to assume that pro bono
mediators will keep the program going long-term. If it is necessary to make
mediation mandatory to get more employer participation, then it is also necessary
to provide private mediators that will address employers' concerns about
impartiality.
158. See Gilles, supra note 35, at 1409-10 (explaining why the Department of
Justice has brought only a few cases challenging police corruption over five years);
see also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 112, at 30 (noting that those wanting to use
the legal system for social reform have neglected the impact of politics).
159. Harkavy, supra note 16, at 155 & n.178 (citing Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112
Stat. 2681 (1998)).
160. Although the amount of money required may be subject to control by
Congress, it should not be part of the fights that Congress gets into with
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mediation will cut costs overall and provide a powerful dispute
resolution tool that is apolitical and not based upon the wealth of
the parties involved. 6'
B. Separately Funded, Private Mediation as a Response to the
Meddling
With the history of Congress's use of its funding whims as a
control on the EEOC in mind, this Article has proposed the use of
private mediators with separate and ongoing funding that is not
linked to the EEOC's funding. Professor John P. McCrory has
recently posed that there are several options in selecting mediators
for a mandatory mediation program.'62 Applying those same
factors, Congress could pursue the following options for the
EEOC's mandatory mediation program: 1) use EEOC employees;
2) refer the disputes to community mediation centers; 3) use
volunteer mediation panels; 4) use mediation panels of private
practitioners who work for a fixed fee; or 5) use private
practitioners selected and paid by the parties.63  This Article
proposes that Congress should fund the program by using private
practitioners who work for a fixed fee paid through a congressional
program. The only real concern is getting Congress to fund the
program.'6 SPIDR has also suggested that any mandatory
government agencies like the EEOC.
161. See Fiss, supra note 113, at 1076-77 (arguing that ADR creates a second
class system of justice where the wealth of the parties dictates the type of justice
involved because the rich do not have to settle for anything less than the court
system); see also Jerrold S. Auerbach, Justice Without Law? 144 (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1983) (arguing that alternative dispute resolution creates
a two-tier system of justice with ADR being used by the poor and the weak with
weaker procedures and protections than the court system which the rich still may
pursue).
162. See McCrory supra note 110, at 850-53 & nn.2-7 (referring to a mandatory
mediation program for courts and listing the following categories: 1. court
employees; 2. community mediation centers; 3. volunteer mediation panels; 4.
mediation panels of private practitioners who charge a fixed fee; 5. private
practitioners selected and paid by the parties).
163. Id.
164. There are various problems with the other options. Those problems
include fears that EEOC mediators will try to force settlements and not keep the
mediation confidential, fears that volunteers and community mediators will not
present enough mediators who are familiar with employment discrimination law or
willing to do mediation without some compensation, and concerns that if the
parties choose the mediators, the repeat player employers will select the same
mediators all the time which undermines the overall competence of the mediators
in the program. See McCrory supra note 110, at 842-43, 851-53 & nn.111-13, 134-
44 (analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of each option as to how the mediators
should be determined and paid).
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mediation program should be funded similar to actual trial
litigation.6 5 The theory is that government should not mandate a
program and then force the participants to pay fees for it."6 If
Congress is unwilling to fund the program without requiring that
the parties pay some user fee, it should still allow those parties who
cannot afford to pay the fee to participate in the mediation
167program.
At first glance, one might assume that it is unrealistic to
propose that Congress would devote funds to a private mediation
program as a supplement to government enforcement. However,
Congress has used private services when it had concerns about
agency failures in other contexts."6 Likewise, the decision to
supplement EEOC enforcement by private mediation would likely
be supported by both sides of the aisle, which generally agree about
the positives of mediation. Thus, by having a statutory mandate to
provide separate funding for the mediation program at say $10
million dollars for the next five years, Congress could allow the
program to function without major meddling. Then, if certain
members of Congress don't like what the EEOC is doing with its
enforcement initiatives, they can't just use the annual budgeting
process to cut back on the tremendously successful private and
mandatory mediation program. If Congress wanted to change the
program, it would have to do so by some new enactment. To
ensure the integrity of the program, Congress could let the
provisions for funding the private mandatory mediation program
165. See McCrory, supra note 110, at. 827.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 826-29 & n.59 (discussing the concerns including the politics involved
with inadequate funding of mandatory mediation programs and legislative actions
necessary to remedy these concerns). Efforts should be made to start the program
without any fees to the participants if it is going to be mandatory. Although there
is evidence that parties will still pay reasonable user fees without complaint if the
quality of the mediation services offered is very high. Id. at 829.
168. See, e.g., Laveta Casdorph, Comment, The Constitution and Reconstitution
of the Standing Doctrine, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 471, 510-14 (1999) (claiming that
Congress incorporated private citizen-suit provisions into environmental statutes
to cure problems, including the lack of effective agency oversight by any of the
three branches of government and the fear of "agency capture," wherein agency
employees become less motivated over time to make decisions and that can
adversely affect the regulated community's interests); Robert B. June, Note, The
Structure of Standing Requirements for Citizen Suits and the Scope of
Congressional Power, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 761, 764 (1994) (stating that "Congress
first established the citizen suit in the 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act, in
response to a perceived governmental failure to enforce the statute").
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sunset so that after five years, the program would automatically
terminate absent congressional action to reauthorize the program.69
VII. Conclusion: Using Private Mandatory Mediation to Establish
a New Enforcement Paradigm
The fault for the problems with the EEOC's lack of
enforcement and problems with handling of charges lies at the feet
of Congress not the EEOC. The legislative development of Title
VII, through its original enactment and subsequent amendments,
has been characterized by compromise positions that have had a
significant detrimental impact on enforcement of Title VII.
Accordingly, congressional one-upmanship and partisan politics has
plagued the EEOC from the very beginning with the passage of a
faulty compromise that made the EEOC a toothless tiger.
This compromise has taken its toll. To allow some form of a
civil rights bill to pass, liberal members of Congress and the
President permitted conservative Republicans and southern
Democrats to wiggle out of the initial efforts to make the EEOC a
strong enforcement agency. This compromise has, at least,
provided a mechanism for addressing employment discrimination
under law that did not exist before Title VII. However, that
compromise has distorted the focus of the EEOC, permitting critics
who did not want the EEOC to be a strong enforcement agency to
now complain that the EEOC is not doing enough to process
charges. Those critics support cutting money and resources from
the agency and preventing any long-term focus on systemic
enforcement programs. As proposed by this Article, Congress can
169. Congress has used such sunset provisions before. In 1990, Congress passed
the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act which encouraged federal agencies to
use informal procedures as an alternative to formal adjudication. That statute
contained a sunset provision requiring it to lapse in six years and Congress then
granted permanent reauthorization in 1996. See Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act (ADRA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990)
(authorizing and promoting the use of ADR by federal government agencies and
codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.), as amended, by ADRA of 1996, 5 U.S.C.
§ 571 et seq. (2000); see also Peter R. Steenland, Jr. & Peter A. Appel, The
Ongoing Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal Government Litigation,
27 U. TOL. L. REV. 805, 806, 806 nn.66-72 (1996) (discussing how Congress
permanently reauthorized the ADRA in 1996 after the sunset provisions of the
1990 Act had passed and suggesting that the continued use of ADR by government
agencies has positive effects in saving time and valuable resources of the agencies).
Likewise, Congress could create a five-year sunset on the mandatory private
mediation program that would create an investment of $10 million a year for five
years. At the end of the five-year sunset, Congress could address the issue again
through a permanent reauthorization, an additional sunset period or through
cancellation.
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correct the initial compromise and long-term neglect of the
EEOC's enforcement powers by allocating the funds to an ongoing
private and mandatory mediation program.
By attempting to expose the effects of the faulty compromise
and proposing private mandatory mediation as a viable alternative,
one hopes that the EEOC can get out of the business of charge
processing on a regular basis. This would allow the EEOC to
become the agency that civil rights leaders hoped it would be
during the legislative efforts to pass Title VII.
One remaining problem is that ever since it granted the EEOC
enforcement power, Congress has used its funding and consent
powers to still make the agency toothless. Even now the tremen-
dous efforts made to improve charge processing and enforcement
are up for political challenge as the George W. Bush administration
chooses two new commissioners, including a chair, and a vice-
chair."' It may be unrealistic to ever expect that the EEOC will be
a powerful tool in eradicating discrimination in the workplace
because of ongoing political maneuvering. Without the ability to
set long-term policy consistently, it is likely that the executive,"'
170. See Nancy Montwieler, EEOC: Commission's Future Remains Unclear
With Three Democrats at Leadership Helm, 9 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-1 (Jan. 12,
2001). All three of the current Commissioners are Democrats and President Bush
will be able to appoint only two more Commissioners through July 2002, when the
first Commissioner's term expires. Id. At the time of preparing this Article,
President Bush had not selected a Commissioner. Since that time and before the
Article went to the publisher, President Bush has selected a new Chair, Car
Dominguez. See Reed Abelson, Anti-Bias Agency Is Short of Will and Cash, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2001, Sec. 3, at 1 (describing President Bush's nomination of Car
Dominguez as the new EEOC Chair and the overall ineffectiveness of the EEOC
due to government bureaucracy, politics and lack of funding). After Ms.
Dominguez's appointment, Ida Castro resigned as a Commissioner. As this
Article goes to press, President Bush has not made a decision about Ms. Castro's
replacement, but he is now in a position to appoint three commissioners, including
Ms. Dominguez, to establish his overall control over the EEOC and his general
mark on the administration of the agency. See Nancy Montwieler, Ex-EEOC
Chairwoman Expresses Concern Over Agency Direction in Bush Administration,
163 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) B-1 (Aug. 23, 2001) (describing comments of former
Chair Ida Castro as to her concern that the Republican administration may cut the
EEOC budget and back-off on important programs necessary for the EEOC to
function properly). The initial spin about the EEOC under its new Chair,
Commissioner Dominguez, has already started. See Patrick McGeehan, U.S. Sues
Morgan Stanley, Charging Sex Bias in a Firing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2001, at C1
(describing lawsuit by the EEOC in what new Chair Dominguez called the first
action to contend with a major Wall Street firm that did not treat female
professionals fairly and noting that "the suit signaled that Bush administration
officials would enforce antidiscrimination laws for even the highest-paid
workers").
171. Because the President can appoint the chair and vice-chair of the EEOC,
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legislative and even the judicial branch will intervene to limit the
power of the EEOC.
However, at least one program, mediation, appears to be a tool
that all the stakeholders and political pundits have enthusiastically
endorsed for the long-term.' Therefore, Congress should
expressly require the use of mediation under Title VII by passing
legislation, possibly by an amendment to the pending NEDRA, that
would mandate the use of private mediation to resolve EEOC
charges. By mandating mediation, employers will participate at a
much higher rate. By making it private, the perception that the
"plaintiff-oriented" EEOC and its employee mediators will use
mediation to force settlements will become a dead issue.173
those officials apparently can depart from policies that were established by prior
EEOC regulations. See Statements Favoring EEOC's Use of Goals and Timetables
Before House Labor Subcommittee on Employment Opportunities, 50 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) F-1 (Mar. 14, 1986) (describing objections to actions of EEOC
General Counsel's refusal to use affirmative action goals and timetables in
establishing remedies for Title VII violations despite their longstanding use
because then-Chairman Clarence Thomas and the then-Acting General Counsel
for the EEOC, Johnny Butler, along with then-Attorney General William
Bradford Reynolds, had views opposing affirmative action).
172. See Montwieler, supra note 170, at C-1 (noting the comments of the former
Republican Commissioner, Reginald Jones, that mediation of EEOC disputes is a
common theme with bipartisan support). Former EEOC Commissioner Jones has
always been a big proponent of ADR and has led Republican support of it since he
first joined the EEOC. See EEOC: Newest Commissioner Jones Says EEOC
Should Make Dispute Resolution Happen, 178 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) C-1 (Sept.
13, 1996) (discussing then-Commissioner Jones's statement that the EEOC must
"zealously" pursue ADR to ensure that parties resolve their disputes without
litigation and without having to give up any protection provided by general
litigation).
173. See Harders, supra note 153, at 30 (noting comments of EEOC contract
mediator, John L. Quinn, that "the elimination of contract attorneys [as mediators]
will "cause the agency to backslide in terms of the willingness of defendants to
participate in mediation" because "[tihe EEOC is perceived as being more
plaintiff-oriented."). In response to a question about why private mediators
should be employed instead of EEOC mediators, Professor Lamont Stallworth,
one of the contributors to NEDRA, stated: "the EEOC is wrong to use its own
employees as volunteer mediators... [e]mployers [also] err when they use internal
staff to mediate disputes. The perception of fairness is as important as fairness
itself,... and the mediator has to be neutral in fact and in the parties'
perceptions." Alternative Dispute Resolution: Arbitrator/Mediator Urges
Legislation to Encourage Job Dispute Resolution Mediation, 110 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) A-4 (June 9, 1998); see also Fawn W. Johnson, Top Ten Things Not to Say
at a Mediation, 59 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) B-2 (Mar. 27, 2000) (noting that two of
the major concerns for employers about mediation are being forced to put some
money on the table and the need for a "firewall to keep mediation matters
confidential" especially after the parties do not agree to a settlement via
mediation).
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Under this Article's proposal, the EEOC will be charged with
developing, training and monitoring a list of outside, experienced
and diverse private mediators who will work with the parties to
resolve their EEOC charges. 74 All parties to cases that the EEOC
decides to refer to mediation will be required to participate. These
private mediation sessions will become the main charge processing
vehicle instead of the charge prioritizing triage procedures currently
being used by the EEOC.1 75 By establishing funding separate from
the EEOC's annual funding, the private mandatory mediation
program may operate without being a whipsaw for political
maneuvers. If Congress will solidify the long-term investment and
financial support for the use of mediation, the EEOC can then shift
to some of the other major enforcement initiatives1 76 that have been
neglected in the past. 7  Congress may still choose to prevent the
EEOC from proceeding with those enforcement objectives for its
174. See Johnson, supra note 173, at B-2 (describing the EEOC's mediation
program out of its San Francisco district office that used solely contract mediators
with backgrounds in employment law and where the EEOC held frequent
roundtables to communicate the EEOC's expectations and where it also held
mock mediations to help employers understand how it works with private
mediators).
175. Federal courts may still not like that "C" charges are dismissed
immediately and "B" charges may still come directly to court after a dismissal, but
that is the regime Congress intended with private claimants having the right to file
in court to enforce their claims. Over the last decade, the number of employment
discrimination cases in federal court tripled. See Employment Bias Cases in
Federal Court Almost Tripled in Previous Decade, DOJ Says, 13 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) A-1 (Jan. 20, 2000) (discussing a U.S. Dept. of Justice study finding that
although the number of federal employment discrimination cases had tripled from
8,413 in 1990 to 23,735 in 1998, the percentage of cases that were disposed of by
trial declined from nine percent to five percent, and the percentage of all cases
filed that ended in a verdict for the plaintiff fell from two percent to 1.6 percent).
176. See Silver, supra note 78, at 522 (noting the value of using mediation to
"free scarce agency resources for the eradication of systemic discrimination").
Those initiatives that the EEOC could pursue include developing tester initiatives,
preparing class action/pattern and practice cases and dealing with systemic wage
disparities. These are all programs the EEOC has endorsed at one time. See, e.g.,
Latest Developments, Fair Empl. Prac. (BNA), at 5 (May 22, 1995) (statements of
then EEOC Chair, Gilbert Cassellas, about the need for funding to focus on
"classwide and pattern and practice cases); EEOC Issues New Guidance on Legal
Standing of Testers, at http://www.eeoc.gov/press/5-24-96a.html (visited Feb. 15,
2001); EEOC Focuses on Pay Equity at Meeting in Philadelphia, (Apr. 15, 1999) at
http://www.eeoc.gov/presss/4-15-99.html (visited Feb. 15, 2001).
177. Donald G. Aplin, Federal Employees: Congress Asks EEOC About Delays,
Backlog Reliability of Data Regarding Federal Workers, 64 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA)
A-5 (April 3, 2000) (noting during congressional review of EEOC's handling of
federal employees' backlog of charges that Post Office and Air Force
representatives testified that mediation had helped focus their resources on its
mission goals rather than being forced to put resources and energy into the formal
EEO process).
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own political reasons. But, at least, the use of mandatory mediation
will create a paradigmatic shift in how the EEOC manages its
enforcement activities.
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APPENDIX: NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION ACT





To amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, to require the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to mediate employee claims arising under
such Acts, and for other purposes.
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 7, 2000
Mrs. CLAYTON introduced the following bill which was referred
to the Committee on Education and the Workforce
A BILL
To amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, to require the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to mediate employee claims arising under
such Acts, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the 'National Employment Dispute
Resolution Act of 2000 (NEDRA).
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The prohibitive costs and emotional toll of litigation as
well as the growing backlog of employment civil rights claims
and lawsuits has impeded the protection and enforcement of
workplace civil rights.
(2) Mediation is an economical, participatory, and
expeditious alternative to traditional, less cooperative methods
of resolving employment disputes.
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(3) Mediation enables disputants to craft creative solutions
and settlements, surpassing the reach of traditional remedies,
thereby possibly protecting the continuity of the employment
relationship.
(4) As we enter the new millennium, a national program of
directed or required participation in mediation where any
settlement is voluntary mandated mediation for certain
employ-ment and contract disputes, will help fulfill the goal of
equal opportunity in work and business places of the United
States.
(5) Overt and subtle discrimination still exists in our society
and in the workplace.
(6) Overt and subtle forms of discrimination cause substantial
measurable economic and non-economic costs to employers
and the American workforce, create a barrier to fully realizing
equal opportunity in the workplace, and are contrary to public
policy promoting equal opportunity in the workplace.
(b) PURPOSES-The purposes of this Act are-
(1) to establish a fair and effective alternative means by
which employees and covered employers may have an
increased likeli-hood of resolving both alleged overt and
subtle forms or acts of discrimination without the
necessity of the employee taking some form of legal action
against the employer,
(2) in accordance with the various public policies
encouraging the use of mediation, to make mediation
available at an early stage of an employment dispute,
thus-
(A)possibly reducing economic and noneconomic
costs,
(B) preserving the employment relationship and
decreasing acrimony, and
(C)decreasing the filing of a number of formal
discrim-ination complaints, charges, and lawsuits
and further burdening our public justice system,
and
(3) to provide that the participation in mediation shall
not preclude either the employee-disputant or covered
employer-disputant from having access to the public
justice system.
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SEC. 3. AMENDMENTS TO TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.
(a) FEDERAL EMPLOYEES-Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq.) is amended-
(1) in section 706(a) ((42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-5)) by inserting
after the 7th sentence the following:
'Regardless of whether the Commission makes an
investigation under this subsection, the Commission
shall provide counseling services regarding, and
endeavor to responsibly address and resolve, claims of
unlawful discrimination using certified contract
mediators.', and
(2) in section 711(a) ((42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-10)) by adding at
the end the following:
'Every employer, employment agency, and labor
organization shall provide to each employee and each
member, individually, a copy of the materials required
by this section to be so posted.'.
(a) OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE-
Section 718 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-17) is
amended-
(1) by inserting '(a)' after 'SEC. 718', and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
(b) The Office of Federal Contract Compliance shall endeavor to
responsibly address and resolve any alleged discrimination using
mediation with respect to which this section applies.
(c) An employer who establishes, implements an approved internal
conflict management program or system providing the use of a
certified mediator participates in mediation under this section shall
be given preferred status in contract bidding for additional and for
maintaining current Federal Government contracts.
(d) An employer who is a party to a Government contract or the
agency of the United States shall assume the costs of mediation
under this section, including the fees of the mediator and any travel
and lodging expenses of the employee, if such travel exceeds 25
miles, one way. Any settlement shall include, among other things,
any appropriate and reasonable attorney fees.
(e) Retaliation by an employer who is a party to a Government
contract or the agency of the United States, or the destruction of
evidence, shall result in the imposition of appropriate civil or
criminal sanctions. The participation in mediation shall be at the
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option of the employee. The participation in mediation shall not
preclude the employee's access to any State, local, or Federal EEO
enforcement agency or any State or Federal court.
(f) The Office of Federal Contract Compliance shall have authority
over employers who are parties to Government contracts that fail
to comply with this section. Failure to comply shall result in the
loss of a current Government contract and disqualification from
consideration for future Government contracts.
(g) No resolution by the disputants may contravene the provisions
of a valid collective bargaining agreement between an employer
who is a part to a Government contract and a labor union or
certified bargaining representative. Any voluntary settlement out-
come and agreement may not be in conflict with the collective
bargaining agreement.'.
SEC. 4. AMENDMENTS TO THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 621
et seq.) is amended -
(1) in section 7(e) ((29 U.S.C.A. 626)) by inserting after the 2d
sentence the following:
'The Commission shall provide counseling services regarding, and
endeavor to responsibly address and resolve, claims of unlawful
discrimination using certified contract mediators.', and
(2) in section 8 ((29 U.S.C.A. 627)) by adding at the end the
following:
"Every employer, employment agency, and labor organization shall
provide to each employee and each member, individually, a copy of
the materials required by this section to be so posted.'.
SEC. 5. AMENDMENT TO AMERICANS WITH DISA-
BILITIES ACT OF 1990.
Section 107(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42
U.S.C. 12117(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following:
'The Commission shall provide counseling services regarding, and
endeavor to responsibly address and resolve, claims of unlawful
discrimination using certified contract mediators.'.
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SEC. 6. MEDIATION.
(a) DEFINITIONS-For purposes of this section:
(1) The term 'employer' means any Federal agency (including
Federal courts) or business enterprise receiving Federal funds
of $200,000 or greater or having 20 or more employees.
(2) The term 'mediator' means any neutral, third-party,
including an attorney and a nonattorney, who is trained in the
mediation process and has a demonstrable working knowledge
in relevant EEO and employment law, including a third party
who is-
(A) appointed or approved by a competent court, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a certified
mediation center, or a university, or
(B) jointly chosen by the disputants.
(3) The term 'trained mediation professional' means a person
who-
(A) has participated in employment mediation training
of 40 or more hours, or
(B)has co-mediated with or been supervised by another
trained certified mediation professional for at least three
employment or contract dispute cases of no fewer than 15
hours.
(4) The term 'certified mediation center' includes any private
or public entity that is qualified to facilitate the employment or
contract mediation process and provide training on
employment and contract dispute resolution, including, but not
limited to, the American Arbitration Association, the
American Bar Association, the Center for Employment
Dispute Resolution, CPR Conflict Institute, JAMS/Endispute,
United States Arbitration and Mediation, Inc., Institute on
Conflict Resolution at Cornell University, and the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution.
(b) REQUIREMENTS-
(1) All employers shall-
(A) establish an internal dispute resolution program or
system that provides, as a voluntary option, employee-
disputant access to external third-party certified
mediators,
(B) participate in mediation if the employee has
exhausted the internal dispute resolution program or
system and has formally requested mediation without the
filing of a charge or lawsuit, and
(C)participate in mediation if the claimant has filed a
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charge or lawsuit and the claimant formally requests
mediation.
* (2) While the mediation settlement outcome
would be voluntary, the employer shall participate in
mediation where the employee-disputant has
expressed a desire to mediate.
(3) Under all circumstances, the employee-
disputant is entitled to legal representation.
(4) Employers shall inform employee-disputants
of the mediation alternative and their respective
rights thereof, and the employee-disputant would
have 30 days in which to decide whether to
participate in mediation.
(5) When an employee-disputant voluntarily
agrees to participate in the mediation process, any
applicable statute of limitations shall be tolled, and
the private tolling agreement shall be enforceable in
any court of competent jurisdiction.
(6) The employee and employer disputants shall
not have more than 90 days within which to resolve
the dispute.
(7) Should mediation prove unsuccessful, the
employer shall again inform the employee-disputant
of their rights, in writing including the right to
pursue the matter under any applicable State,
county, local ordinance, or Federal statutes.
(8) Consistent with section 705 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ((42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-4)), the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, and any
State or local authority involved in proceedings
described in section 706 ((42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-5)),
shall offer technical assistance to any unrepresented
or self-represented party, provided that a formal
complaint has been filed with the Commission or
such authority. Such assistance shall include, but not
be limited to-
(A) pre-mediation counseling,
(B) assistance in understanding the status of
relevant case law,
(C) assistance in what would be the
appropriate remedy if the instant claim were to
be found to have merit, and
(D) assistance in drafting any post-mediation
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settlement agreement or resolution.
(9) Submission of a claim for mediation shall not
preclude either the claimant or respondent from
seeking other appropriate relief on that claim,
except that neither party shall seek other relief until
the mediation process has concluded.
(10) Any settlement as a result of the mediation
process shall be strictly voluntary and remain
confidential except for research and evaluation
purposes.
(11) In every case, the privacy, privilege, and
confidentiality of all parties to the dispute shall be
preserved, including complaint intake personnel and
mediation consultations.
(c) ATTORNEY'S OBLIGATION TO ADVISE CLIENTS OF
MEDIATION-For the purposes of this Act and all of the other
related statutes, attorneys and consultants are legally obliged to
advise their clients of the existence of the mediation alternative and
their obligations under the Act to participate in mediation in 'good
faith'.
(d) JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT-Either party to a mediation
agreement to bring an action of enforcement in a Federal district
court of competent jurisdiction, however any matter discussed or
material presented during mediation shall not be used in any
subsequent local, State, or Federal administrative or court
proceeding. The confidential provisions of any internal conflict
management program or system or agreement to mediation shall be
immune from attack by any third party. 1999 Cong. H.R. 4593.

